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ALCOHOL PROHIBITION IN THE NEW MEXICO
AND ARIZONA STATE JUDICIARIES AT 100
YEARS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW AND
SHAPING OF SOCIETY IN THE SOUTHWEST
Joshua Kastenberg*

On January 16, 1920, the United States became a “dry” nation, at least as
intended by the recently adopted the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution and
its implementing legislation, the National Prohibition Act. In his comprehensive
study on the national alcohol ban, Last Call the Rise and Fall of Prohibition, Daniel
Okrent asks his readers: “How did a freedom-loving people decide to give up a
private right that had been exercised by millions upon millions since the first
European colonists arrived in the New World?”1 This article does not seek to answer
Okrent’s broad question, but rather, provide insight into how the state supreme courts
of the nation’s two newest contiguous states not only enforced the national and state
liquor laws, but also developed and shaped law and society alike in their respective
jurisdictions.
In the period preceding and during Prohibition (1900-1933), the New
Mexico and Arizona supreme courts borrowed analysis from other state courts of
appeal across the country, albeit in an occasionally questionable or opportunistic
manner. Their shaping of society included the closure of the saloon, a cultural staple
of the western states.2 The alcohol ban also cemented a social hierarchy into the
status quo. When New Mexico achieved statehood, over forty percent of its residents
were Spanish-American, and largely Catholic.3 While there were Catholic
temperance movements in the United States, they never approached the zeal of
Protestant and anti-immigrant groups who espoused national prohibition and were
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1. DANIEL OKRENT, LAST CALL: THE RISE AND FALL OF PROHIBITION 3 (2010).
2. See SARA E. QUAY, WESTWARD EXPANSION 118 (2002). Quay writes: “The local saloon was the
central meeting place for most western towns . . . [a]s a site of socializing, eating, and most important
drinking.” Id. As anecdotal evidence of the saloon’s centrality in the west, the New Mexico Territorial
Supreme Court, in United States v. Spencer, reversed a criminal conviction after discovering that a bailiff
and judge permitted jurors to begin their morning deliberations in a saloon while consuming whiskey
purchased by the bailiff. 1896-NMSC-032, 8 N.M. 667, 47 P. 715. In this decision, the justices noted that
while there was no evidence of outside influence on the jurors, if the verdict were allowed to “it might
tend to establish a dangerous precedent, and one that might prove harmful to the administration of justice,
and a due regard for the rights of trial by jury.” Id. ¶ 4.
3. See CORRINE M. MCCONNAUGHY, THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT IN AMERICA: A
REASSESSMENT 195–205 (2013). Professor McConnaughy points out that Anglo women of means were
involved in ensuring statehood and drafting the first constitution. See id. The exclusion of Hispanic women
from the process of achieving statehood meant that Catholics were also underrepresented. See id.
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anti-Catholic.4 Indeed, the temperance movement in the United States largely began
as a Puritan (Protestant) campaign to end the production and consumption of “demon
rum.”5 In Arizona, suffrage was linked with prohibition and nativism. The dual antialcohol and enfranchisement of women campaigns succeeded by the time the state
constitution took effect.6 However, women in positions of power were largely nonCatholic and white.
Of course, none of the actions of either state supreme court could have
likely occurred if not for the United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on
alcohol. By June of 1920, the Court not only upheld the means by which the
Eighteenth Amendment came into force, but also all aspects of the National
Prohibition Act.7 Moreover, the Court, in four additional respects, enabled a vigorous
ban against “intoxicating liquor” to occur in both New Mexico and Arizona, even
before 1920. First, the Court upheld Congress’s delegation of authority to the
Secretary of War to prevent the distribution of liquor near military bases after the
United States declared war on the Imperial German Government in 1917.8 The Army
established large military training camps in both Arizona and New Mexico to prepare
an enormous force to fight in Europe.9 And, as there was already a sizeable military
presence in both states as a result of continual fighting between competing factions
in Mexico and Pancho Villa’s raid into New Mexico, the ban affected commerce in
the two states.10 In 1919 the Court upheld the federal wartime prohibition on alcohol
production even though the German government had since collapsed and a successor
government signed an armistice ending the war.11
Second, in a series of decisions predating 1913, the Court upheld the
authority of state governments to ban the possession, sale, and transport of alcohol.12
In 1873, the Court sustained an Iowa law which prohibited alcohol sales.13 Fourteen
years later, in Mugler v. Kansas the Court determined that even when the enactment
of prohibitory laws negatively impacted private enterprise, the Constitution’s
4. See, e.g., KENNETH C. BARNES, ANTI-CATHOLICISM IN ARKANSAS: HOW POLITICIANS, THE
PRESS, THE KLAN, AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS IMAGINED AN ENEMY, 1910–1960, at 69–90 (2016); Dierdre
M. Moloney, Combatting “Whiskey’s Work”: The Catholic Temperance Movement in Late NineteenthCentury America, 16 U.S. CATH. HISTORIAN 1, 5–6 (1998).
5. See, e.g., TYLER ANBINDER, NATIVISM AND SLAVERY: THE NORTHERN KNOW NOTHINGS AND
THE POLITICS OF THE 1850S, at 43–44 (1992); IAN R. TYRELL, SOBERING UP: FROM TEMPERANCE TO
PROHIBITION IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA, 1800–1860, at 298–302 (1979).
6. See HEIDI J. OSSELEAR, WINNING THEIR PLACE: ARIZONA WOMEN IN POLITICS, 1883–1950, at
64–65 (2009).
7. See National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920).
8. See Act of May 18, 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-12, § 13, 40 Stat. 76, 83. This law was upheld in
McKinley v. United States, 249 U.S. 397, 399 (1919).
9. See DAVID R. WOODWARD, THE AMERICAN ARMY AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR 72–74 (2014).
10. Id.
11. See Hamilton v. Ky. Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146 (1919)
12. See, e.g., Beer Co., v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25 (1877). In Beer Co., the plaintiff corporation
had been granted a state charter to brew and sell malt liquor and beer in 1828. Id. at 26. However, the state
legislature passed a prohibition law in 1869 and the company sued the state for trammeling its property
rights under the Constitution’s Takings Clause. Id. The Court determined that the stoppage of future
alcohol production was not a taking of the company’s property. Id. at 33. See also Kidd v. Pearson, 128
U.S. 1 (1888).
13. See Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129 (1873).
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Takings Clause did not protect commercial property owners.14 Mugler arose from
three Kansas brewers’ challenge to a statute which rendered their previously licensed
breweries derelict after the state legislature forbade the production of alcohol for any
consumptive reason, including export to other states.15 In 1891, in In re Rahrer, the
Court upheld a state government’s authority to prohibit the sale of alcohol within its
borders but determined—or, in the words of Chief Justice Walter Clark of the North
Carolina Supreme Court, “hinted”—that it could not, absent federal legislation,
prohibit the transport of alcohol into its borders.16 In 1913, Congress acted “on the
Court’s hint” in Rahrer and passed such legislation popularly known as the WebbKenyon Act.17
Third, prior to the National Prohibition Act, the Court had, in one sense,
already directly blessed the prohibition of alcohol in New Mexico and Arizona. In
United States v. Sandoval, the Court upheld the power of Congress to criminalize the
sale or introduction of liquor on Indian lands located within the states.18 In 1897,
Congress crafted a criminal statute prohibiting the introduction of intoxicating liquor
to Indian country, but after New Mexico became a state in 1912, there was a question
as to whether this law still applied to the Pueblo Tribe.19 Using racially demeaning
language, the Court upheld the statute based on Congress’ authority to regulate
commerce with Indian tribes in an opinion penned by Justice Willis Van Devanter.20
Fourth, the Court’s decision was an unsurprising reflection of contemporary views
on the relationship between Native Americans and alcohol.21 In 1904, the Arizona
Supreme Court upheld a conviction for the sale of alcohol to a Native American,
even though the defendant professed not to know of the buyer’s ethnicity.22 In doing
14. 123 U.S. 623, 668–69 (1887).
15. See id. at 664. Moreover, the Court assured state governments that prohibitory laws need not take
into consideration the past lawful practice of brewers, distillers, and saloon-owners in holding:
It is true, that, when the defendants in these cases purchased or erected their breweries,
the laws of the State did not forbid the manufacture of intoxicating liquors. But the State
did not thereby give any assurance, or come under an obligation, that its legislation
upon that subject would remain unchanged.
Id. at 669.
16. 140 U.S. 545, 555 (1891). In this decision, Chief Justice Fuller noted:
No reason is perceived why, if Congress chooses to provide that certain designated
subjects of interstate commerce shall be governed by a rule which divests them of that
character at an earlier period of time than would otherwise be the case, it is not within
its competency to do so.
Id. at 562. See also State v. Cardwell, 81 S.E. 628, 630 (N.C.1915) (Clark, C.J. concurring) (stating that
Congress acted “upon [a] hint”). Three years later, the Court determined that a license requirement for the
peddling of all alcohol was within a state’s police power. See Emert v. Missouri, 156 U.S. 296 (1895).
17. See Cardwell, 81 S.E. at 630 (Clark, C.J., concurring).
18. 231 U.S. 28, 48 (1913).
19. Id. at 37–38.
20. Id. at 49. Van Devanter noted, in relying on the statements of federal agents, that the Pueblo
Indians, in comparison to other tribes “although industrially superior, they are intellectually and morally
inferior to many of them; and that they are easy victims to the evils and debasing influence of intoxicants.”
Id. at 41. The law did not apply to New Mexico’s non-Indian citizenry, though one could wonder whether
a similar finding could be upheld by the Court in regard to gender or ethnicity. See id. at 49.
21. See, e.g., DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT:
THE MASKING OF JUSTICE 121 (1997)
22. See United States v. Stofello, 76 P. 611, 612 (Ariz. 1904).
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so, Arizona’s justices not only upheld the offense of alcohol sales to Native
Americans a strict liability crime, they also placed a duty on the state’s residents to
determine the ethnicity of prospective buyers.23
This article is divided into four sections. The first section examines the
development of liquor limitation laws in the New Mexico and Arizona territories.
The territorial supreme courts differed from the state supreme courts of both states
in several regards, but namely—for the purpose of this article—the justices of the
territorial courts were presidentially appointed to four-year terms subject to
senatorial confirmation.24 The decisions issued by the territorial courts were
persuasive on the state supreme courts in the sense that neither Arizona’s nor New
Mexico’s justices decided to overturn prior territorial decisions on alcohol. The
second section analyzes Arizona and New Mexico Supreme Court decisions prior to
the National Prohibition Act. After achieving statehood, Arizona’s constitution and
state legislature placed stringent restrictions on alcohol through prohibition. In
contrast, New Mexico’s voters opted for a “local-option” legal scheme until 1917
when the state constitution was amended to prohibit alcohol.25 From 1912 through
1920, the supreme courts of both states borrowed from other state final courts of
appeal to solidify the prohibition laws in effect. This process included several
instances of deciding between conflicting decisions, as well as stretching the purpose
and intent of other appellate court decisions to meet a desired end.
The third section covers the period of the National Prohibition Act’s
existence, from 1920 through 1933. During this period, the two state supreme courts
continued to incorporate decisions from other state courts of appeal in a manner
similar to the second section. However, the supreme courts of both states also
operated during a time of significant federal law-enforcement action. Doctrines of
preemption, incorporation of laws through “reference,” double jeopardy involving
prosecutions under federal and state sovereigns, and statutory interpretation were
given lasting shape by the two state supreme courts. The fourth and final section
concludes the article by examining the influence of the courts during this period as
well as an assessment on their choice of case-law methodology.
I. ALCOHOL: EARLY LAWS, DEMOGRAPHICS AND STATEHOOD
In 1906, Congress passed an enabling act which permitted the residents of
the Arizona, Oklahoma, and New Mexico Territories to seek statehood.26 However,
in passing the act, Congress contemplated that the New Mexico and Arizona
Territories would enter the Union as a single state.27 As a result of Arizona’s Anglo23. Id. at 462. Several state supreme courts upheld the prohibition against the sale of alcohol to
Indians as well as convictions where the defendant professed not to know the ethnicity of the buyer. See,
e.g., People v. Faust, 45 P. 261 (Cal. 1896); State v. Niblett, 102 P. 229 (Nev. 1909).
24. See Act of Feb. 11, 1891, Pub. L. No. 51-131, 26 Stat. 747; Act of Sept. 9, 1850, Pub. L. No. 3149, § 10, 9 Stat. 446, 449; See also John S. Goff, The Appointment, Tenure and Removal of Territorial
Judges: Arizona–A Case Study, 12 AMER. J. LEGAL HIST. 211, 211–231 (1968).
25. The term “local option” denotes municipality by municipality votes on prohibition. For a fuller
definition of local option, see Robert Post, Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of the American
Administrative State: Prohibition in the Taft Court Era, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 182 (2006).
26. See Act of June 16, 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-234, 34 Stat. 267.
27. See id. § 23.
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Protestant population’s opposition to joining with New Mexico on the basis that the
New Mexico Territory had a larger Hispanic and Catholic population, Oklahoma was
the only territory to achieve statehood as a result of this act. 28 In 1910, Congress
reassessed the single-state provision and legislated a new law permitting separate
statehood.29 The 1910 law demanded that a proposed new state, if it were to be
accorded statehood by vote, had to guarantee freedom of religion. However, the sale
of “intoxicating liquors to Indians” had to be forever prohibited.30
Another interesting feature of the 1910 statehood law was that each state
convention’s proposed constitution had to separately gain both Congress’ and
President Taft’s approval, even though the Constitution does not require presidential
acquiescence to admit new states to the Union.31 Taft was to have a lasting influence
in the legal operations of both states. Although he supported statehood for both
Arizona and New Mexico, he opposed admission for either as long as the proposed
state constitutions contained provisions for judicial recall.32 Taft succeeded in having
the provisions removed. He believed that the recall of judges not only politicized the
judiciary, it removed a significant protection against socialism becoming a national
force.33 Secondly, because he appointed the last of the territorial justices, he
remained interested in learning of operation of law in the new states. For instance,
upon being informed that Justice Clarence Roberts intended to retire from the New
Mexico Supreme Court in 1921, Taft penned to him in lauding the decisions issued

28. See Act of June 20, 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-219, 36 Stat. 557. On Arizona’s population’s opposition
to joint statehood, see DAVID R. BERMAN, ARIZONA POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT: THE QUEST FOR
AUTONOMY, DEMOCRACY, AND DEVELOPMENT 30 (1998). According to Professor Berman, New
Mexico’s citizens overwhelmingly favored the joint admission plan but Arizona’s opposed joint
admission by a vote of five to one. See id. at 31.
29. See BERMAN, supra note 28, at 31.
30. See Act of June 20, 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-219, § 2, 36 Stat. 557, 560.
31. See TONI MCCLORY, UNDERSTANDING THE ARIZONA CONSTITUTION 20–29 (2d ed. 2010).
32. See DAVID V. HOLTBY, FORTY-SEVENTH STAR: NEW MEXICO’S STRUGGLE FOR STATEHOOD 255
(2012). As an example of the importance of judicial recall, several attorneys in Arizona lobbied Taft to
permit recall to be a part of the state constitution. For instance, George W. Glowner penned “being a
lawyer of nearly a quarter of a century of active practice, I can see the viciousness of some of its
provisions, particularly the recall provision. But Mr. President, please allow me to state that it is the
judiciary itself is responsible for the attitude the people have.” Letter from George W. Glowner to William
Howard Taft (Feb. 22, 1911) (copy on file with author).
33. See KENNETH P. MILLER, DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE COURTS 192–93 (2009). On Taft’s
worries on socialism becoming a force, he received correspondence from a California attorney, stating “if
Arizona receives your sanction, I expect to see this recall heresy spread from state to state and very quickly
its chief objective, viz, the Federal Constitution and the Supreme Court and the nation itself. The march
of socialism will find no obstacle in its pathway more serious than a piece of paper once called a
Constitution. See letter from Charles Stetson Wheeler to William Howard Taft (Feb. 26, 1911) (copy on
file with author). Taft’s view of the judiciary as a protection against socialism can been understood
through his opponents’ criticism of him. In 1905, Eugene Debs, a labor leader who later ran for president
as a Socialist Party candidate, claimed in a speech titled Growth of the Injunction, that the Judicial Branch
had departed from its duty of impartiality and aligned itself with corporations and banks to the detriment
of labor. Debs went so far as to call Taft, a former judge on the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
and future president, a man with “unswerving loyalty to capital and unmitigated contempt for labor.”
Eugene V. Debs, Growth of the Injunction, in WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF EUGENE V. DEBS 167, 169
(1948).
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during his tenure, “I am glad to know that in appointing you, I have been vindicated
by your becoming Chief Justice of the Court under State authority.”34
Upon entry into the United States, each state established an independent
judicial branch. The New Mexico Supreme Court was largely “Old-Guard”
Republican in its orientation.35 The term “Old Guard” has been used to characterize
Republicans who opposed the newer progressive wing of the party, particularly in
terms of government regulation of commerce and industry.36 The progressives
espoused foreign intervention to topple corrupt Latin American governments as well
as state and federal efforts to root out corruption in city, state, and federal
governments. Progressives also promoted tax policies to build infrastructure and
ensure worker and consumer safety.37 Nationally, progressives in both parties tended
to support prohibition as a means to solve the ills caused by addiction and loss of
work.38 New Mexico’s first three justices, Robert Hanna, Frank W. Parker, and
Clarence J. Roberts, were Republicans. Parker and Roberts had served on the
territorial supreme court.39
A quick biographical comment on each of the justices assists in
understanding their views on prohibition and how it shaped their jurisprudence.
Hanna was a prominent attorney who considered himself a “progressive,” as well as
a prohibitionist.40 Parker was a conservative Republican who served from 1912 to
1932, and in the words of one scholar, “was slow to change.” As in the case of
Roberts, Taft had a role in promoting Parker to serve on the state supreme court. 41
Parker also had a prominent role in President Wilson nominating Colin Neblett to
the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico in 1917.42 Roberts
began his legal career as a prosecutor in Indiana, became a newspaper owner in
Denver, and in 1907 moved to New Mexico where he was elected to the territorial
legislature.43 He retired in 1921 and was replaced by a rapid succession of justices.
In 1923, Samuel Bratton (D) was elected to fill this seat but he resigned the following
year to successfully run for the United States Senate.44 In 1922, the state’s democrats
captured the state house, a senate seat, and a supreme court justiceship when Howard

34. Letter from William Howard Taft to Clarence Roberts (July 30, 1921) (copy on file with author).
35. See, e.g., Susan A. Roberts, The Birth of a Partisan Judiciary, 1910-1911, 5 N.M. L. REV. 1, 3–
10 (1975).
36. See, e.g., ARTHUR PAULSON, REALIGNMENT AND PARTY REVIVAL: UNDERSTANDING AMERICAN
ELECTORAL POLITICS AT THE TURN OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 74 (2000).
37. See, e.g., HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, TO MAKE MEN FREE: A HISTORY OF THE REPUBLICAN
PARTY 140–41 (2014); DANIEL DISALVO, ENGINES OF CHANGE: PARTY FACTIONS IN AMERICAN
POLITICS, 1868–2010, at 70–71 (2012).
38. See DAVID E. KYVIG, REPEALING NATIONAL PROHIBITION 7–8 (2d ed. 2000).
39. See Roberts, supra note 35, at 9, 13. Richard Hanna was a progressive Republican who later ran
for governor as a Democrat. Parker was a conservative Republican who served from 1912 to 1932 and
Clarence Roberts was also a conservative Republican, but he served from 1912 through 1921. See id. at
6–13.
40. See id. at 11–13.
41. Letter from Frank W. Parker to Taft (Nov. 29, 1921) (copy on file with author).
42. Letter from Thomas Gregory to Woodrow Wilson (Jan. 29, 1917) (copy on file with author).
43. See, e.g., Michael J. McGuinness, Hon. Clarence J. Thomas, 7 THE LAWYER AND BANKER AND
SOUTHERN BENCH AND BAR REVIEW 152–53 (Charles E. George ed.,1914).
44. See Susan A. Roberts, The Republican Court, 1912-1922, 5 N.M. L. REV. 14, 14–29 (1975).
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Bickley replaced Bratton. Although Bickley was a Democrat, in 1930, President
Herbert Hoover considered nominating him to the Supreme Court but selected Owen
Roberts instead, at least evidencing Bickley’s standing with the national bar.45 For
the period covered by this article, the justices with longevity and therefore who
influenced the course of alcohol enforcement included Roberts, who left the court in
1921, Parker, who died in office in 1932, and Bickley who served on the court until
his death in 1947.46
Arizona, like New Mexico, had direct elections for selecting its justices.47
Interestingly, none of the territorial justices were later elected to the state supreme
court. As noted by former Arizona Supreme Court Chief Justice, Rebecca White
Berch, Arizona’s territorial justices tended to be incompetent and corrupt and this
may have been a reason none of the them succeeded to the state supreme court.48
According to another study, the participants in the state constitutional convention
intended for judges to be “accountable to the voters,” instead of favoring powerful
interests.49 Thus, if the population supported prohibition, so, too, would the state’s
judges. During much of the Prohibition era, the Arizona Supreme Court consisted of
Henry D. Ross, Archibald G. McAlister, and Alfred C. Lockwood.50 The justices
were hardly progressive in terms of voting rights. In 1928, they determined, that the
state’s Native American population did not possess the right to vote in Porter v.
Hall.51 (However, Ross dissented from the opinion based on the fact that as of 1924,
Native Americans were citizens of the United States).52 While the justices split over
rights of indigenous peoples, they would largely show unity on alcohol-based
appeals.
Ross, a Democrat, was born in Arkansas in 1861, attended the University
of Iowa where he earned a law degree, then moved to Arizona in 1885.53 In addition
to serving as district attorney of Yavapai County, he worked as a school teacher.54
Lockwood, born in Illinois in 1875, did not have formal legal training prior to

45. See CHRISTINE L. NEMACHECK, STRATEGIC SELECTION: PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION OF
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES FROM HERBERT HOOVER THROUGH GEORGE W. BUSH 147 (2007).
46. See Roberts, supra note 44, at 25–26. Although Bickley was a conservative justice, he liberalized
divorce in New Mexico by recognizing the nascent doctrine of a no-fault divorce. See, e.g., J. HERBIE
DIFONZO, BENEATH THE FAULT LINE: THE POPULAR AND LEGAL CULTURE OF DIVORCE IN TWENTIETHCENTURY AMERICA 72–75 (1997).
47. See MCCLORY, supra note 31, at 147–48.
48. See Rebecca White Berch, A History of the Arizona Courts, 3 PHOENIX L. REV. 11, 13 (2011).
49. MCCLORY, supra note 31, at 147.
50. See BERMAN, supra note 28, at 129–30. It was not until 1947, a decade and half after the
Eighteenth Amendment’s repeal, that the court was increased in size from three to five justices. See id.
Although the court consisted of Henry D. Ross, Archibald McAlister and Edward Flanagan at the start of
National Prohibition, Flanagan only served for one year on the court and Lockwood replaced him. See,
e.g., Letter from Henry D. Ross to Taft (Oct. 28, 1921) (copy on file with author).
51. 271 P. 411, 419 (Ariz. 1928).
52. Id. (Ross, J., dissenting).
53. For a biographical sketch on Ross, see Ross Dies: High Court Loses Dean, ARIZONA REPUBLIC,
Feb. 10, 1945; 1 J.O. CONNORS, WHO’S WHO IN ARIZONA 501–03 (1913); and 3 JAMES H. MCCLINTOCK,
ARIZONA:
PREHISTORIC—ABORIGINAL
PIONEER—MODERN:
THE
NATION’S
YOUNGEST
COMMONWEALTH WITHIN A LAND OF ANCIENT CULTURE 72 (1916).
54. CONNORS, supra note 53, at 501–03.
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immigrating to Arizona in 1893.55 For the first two years in the territory he worked
as a teacher and read law before being admitted to practice. In 1914, along with
justices Cunningham and Baker, Ross successfully lobbied President Woodrow
Wilson to appoint Francis Jones, an Arizona prohibitionist and state government
official, to the Interstate Commerce Commission.56 In 1913 the state governor
appointed Lockwood as a trial judge where he developed a reputation for being prolabor. He ran as a Democrat in his election to the supreme bench.57 A democrat,
McAlister was originally from South Carolina and moved to the Arizona territory at
the turn of the century before becoming a school principal in Florence, Arizona.58
He also studied law at night, was elected district attorney, and participated in the
statehood convention.59 It appears than none of these men had ties to the liquor
industry, and were, indeed amenable to prohibition.
a. The New Mexico Territory to Early Statehood
New Mexico’s 1910 state constitution guaranteed the right to vote for all
males and prevented laws from being imposed that would restrict voting rights based
on race, religion, language, color, or the inability to speak.60 Moreover, the state
constitution recognized that Spanish was one of the state’s two languages for the
purpose of this right.61 When the state constitutional convention convened to draft
the constitution, thirty-two of the one hundred men involved were listed as “Spanish
speakers,” meaning their first language was not English and they represented the
territory’s second most sizeable ethnicity.62 In spite of the territory’s Catholic
population, the prohibition forces assumed that they could influence the convention.
The Women’s Christian Temperance Union established eight branches in the
territory, and together with the Anti-Saloon League, they opposed the draft
constitution because it did not enable the state to become wholly dry at once.63
President Taft ignored prohibitionists’ opposition to New Mexico’s admission and
forwarded the constitution, along with a statement of support, to the House of
Representatives which gained congressional approval.64
Prior to statehood, the territory had limits on the sale and manufacture of
alcohol. The New Mexico Territorial Supreme Court, in Territory v. Digneo, upheld
laws preventing the sale of alcohol to minors without parental consent and disavowed

55. Id. at 521.
56. Letter from Henry D. Ross to Woodrow Wilson (Apr. 17, 1920) (copy on file with author). The
Arizona Supreme Court was not alone in endorsing Jones to the Court; Senator Ashurst of Arizona did so
as well. See letter from Henry F. Ashurst to Wilson (Apr. 16, 1920) (copy on file with author).
57. OSSELEAR, supra note 6, at 151.
58. CONNORS, supra note 53, at 518.
59. Id.
60. N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 3 (1910).
61. Id.; see also MAURILLO E. VIGIL, MICHAEL OLSEN & ROY LUJAN, NEW MEXICO: GOVERNMENT
AND POLITICS 101 (1990).
62. ROBERT W. LARSEN, NEW MEXICO’S QUEST FOR STATEHOOD 274 (1968).
63. Id.
64. Id. In 1909 Taft visited Albuquerque, New Mexico and was given a “rather cool reception” by
the city’s citizens who wanted rapid statehood. Apparently this upset Taft, who then promised his full
support. See, e.g., HOWARD BRYAN, ALBUQUERQUE REMEMBERED 179 (2006).
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the doctrine of “repeal by implication” in doing so.65 In 1854, the territorial
legislature outlawed the sale of alcohol to minors without parental consent and
affixed a maximum fine of fifty dollars as a penalty.66 In 1875 the legislature added
as a maximum penalty, a sixty day prison sentence, and in 1901 it enacted a third
statute prohibiting the sale of alcohol, cigarettes and cigars to minors without
parental consent.67 In the 1854 statute, the legislature did not define minor, but under
the territorial laws, a minor was considered to be any person under the age of twentyone, consistent with the national voting laws. However, in the 1875 and 1901
statutes, the legislature defined a minor as a person under the age of eighteen.68
When, in 1908, a nineteen-year-old named Florencio Gonzales purchased alcohol
without his parent’s consent, a prosecuting attorney charged him with violating the
1854 statute and he appealed on the basis that this law had been impliedly repealed
by the territorial legislature in 1875 and again in 1901. The territorial court’s justices,
in perhaps evidencing a desire to judicially limit alcohol, determined that 1854
statute remained in effect because the earlier law was neither repugnant to, nor
irreconcilable with, the later laws.69 In doing so, the court relied on Frost v. Wienie,
an 1895 Supreme Court decision upholding treaty rights guarantees to the Osage
over a later statute enabling homestead settlement on Osage territorial lands.70 The
disfavoring of repeal by implication by the territorial court in Digneo has remained
a part of the state’s jurisprudence since.71
In 1910, the territorial court upheld a law prohibiting saloons within five
miles of a sanitarium or within two miles of a military post.72 Although the court
relied, in large measure, on Mugler and other federal courts’ decisions, it also noted
that the Tennessee Supreme Court, in Webster v. State, had upheld a similar
restriction, albeit one relating to the placement of saloons within four miles of
schoolhouses.73 The defendants in Webster had lawfully opened a saloon prior to the
law, but continued to run the saloon after the law took effect and were convicted
under the state’s criminal code.74 In issuing their ruling, Tennessee’s justices
observed “it may work a hardship, and no doubt will, to at once and summarily close
up a business theretofore legalized and licensed; but this was a matter addressed to
the General Assembly, and not to this court.”75 The territorial court, in issuing Rapp,
also relied on Whitney v. Township Board of Grand Rapids, an 1888 Michigan
Supreme Court decision upholding a law against selling alcohol within one mile of

65. Territory v. Digneo, 1909-NMSC-018, 15 N.M. 157, 103 P. 975.
66. Id. ¶ 2, 103 P. at 975 (citing Sec. 1235 C. L. 1897 (1854)).
67. Id. (citing to Section 1270, C. L. 1897 and Sec. 1, Ch. 3, L. 1901, respectively).
68. Id.
69. Id. ¶ 7, 103 P. at 976.
70. Id. (citing Frost v. Wienie, 157 U.S. 46 (1895)).
71. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 2004-NMSC-032, ¶ 19, 136 N.M. 372, 98 P.3d 1022; Dairyland Ins. Co.
v. Rose, 1979-NMSC-021, ¶ 12, 92 N.M. 527, 591 P.2d 281; Stokes v. N.M. State Bd. of Educ., 1951NMSC-031, ¶ 5, 55 N.M. 213, 230 P.2d 243.
72. Rapp v. Venable, 1910-NMSC-041, 15 N.M. 501, 110 P. 834.
73. Id. ¶ 13, 110 P. at 836.
74. 82 S.W. 179, 180 (Tenn. 1903).
75. Id. at 184.
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“Soldiers’ Homes,” a term denoting homes for aging and injured veterans of the
nation’s wars.76
In Territory of New Mexico v. Church, the court, in 1907, held that saloon
owners were responsible for the acts of their employees.77 The justices partly relied
on Noecker v. People, an 1879 Illinois Supreme Court decision.78 That court decided,
in upholding an indictment, that a pharmacist could be criminally liable for an
employee’s sale of illicit alcohol, even though the pharmacist instructed the
employee not to sell.79 The difficulty with relying on Noecker in this instance—other
than the scant length of the decision and the fact that it upheld an indictment—is that
Illinois’s justices held that it was within a jury’s province to determine whether the
pharmacist’s order to the employee was merely a statement of intent to follow the
law.80 Although the use of Noecker in this decision may have stretched the intent of
that decision, Church established the legal doctrine in New Mexico that saloon
owners, restaurateurs, and hoteliers could be found criminally liable for their
employees’ sale of alcohol to minors.81
In 1913, in Territory of New Mexico v. Lynch, the court reversed a murder
conviction based on a trial judge’s refusal to permit a defense counsel to voir dire
prospective jurors on their support for prohibition.82 The defendant in that case killed
a city marshal who entered into the defendant’s home to conduct an authorized search
for whiskey.83 Important to this decision was the court’s recognition of a division in
society “over a great social and economic question . . . during the throes of the
change from a wet to a dry community.”84 Here, the justices recognized that the stark
division in society between prohibition’s supporters and its defenders may have also
divided society along religious and ethnic lines.

76. Rapp, 1910-NMSC-041, ¶ 14, 110 P. at 836 (citing Whitney v. Twp Bd. of Grand Rapids, 39
N.W. 40 (Mich. 1888)). In recognizing that the enticement of alcohol was detrimental to Civil War
veterans, Michigan’s justices first recognized the duty of the state to care for infirm former soldiers who
had given their “best blood and vital energies to their county in its time of utmost need and peril,” before
concluding:
the maintenance of a saloon at the very door of this institution, with its abundant
temptations to excess in the use of liquor, would be not only detrimental to the health
and welfare of these old soldiers, but at the same time a standing menace to the good
order and necessary discipline which must exist at the Home, or its usefulness and
benefit be destroyed.
Whitney, 39 N.W. at 43.
77. 1907-NMSC-025, ¶ 30, 14 N.M. 226, 91 P. 720.
78. Id. ¶ 28, 91 P. at 723–24. It should be noted that the territorial justices misstated the name of the
decision as McCutcheon v. Illinois. In fact, the case name is Noecker as attached to the case cite.
79. Noecker v. People. 91 Ill. 494, 496–97 (Ill. 1879).
80. See id.
81. See, e.g., State v. Gunter, 1974-NMCA-132, 87 N.M. 71, 529 P.2d 297.
82. 1913-NMSC-038, 18 N.M. 15, 133 P. 405, rev’d on other grounds, State v. Chamberlain, 1991NMSC-094, 112 N.M. 723, 819 P.2d 673.
83. Id. ¶ 2, 133 P. at 405–06.
84. Id. ¶ 17, 133 P. at 407.
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b. Arizona Territory to Early Statehood
As in the case of New Mexico, the Women’s Christian Temperance Union
and Anti-Saloon League had a strong presence in the Arizona Territory on the eve
of statehood. According to Professor David S. Berman, the Women’s Christian
Temperance Union leaders in Arizona pushed to maximize women’s suffrage in the
hopes of turning the state dry.85 Unlike New Mexico, shortly after admission into the
Union, the Arizona legislature tried to impose a literacy test on the voting franchise
to exclude Spanish-speaking males from voting even though Congress and Taft had
forbidden voting restrictions as a condition of admission.86 In this sense, Arizona’s
temperance forces had not only allied with a nativist core of Anglo-Protestant settlers
to restrict minority voting rights, they also linked prohibition with Protestantism.87
Professor Sean Beienburg, in his recent book titled Prohibition, the
Constitution, and States Rights, observed that “Arizona had every reason to be
ardently anti-alcohol, which is why it unsurprisingly adopted prohibition soon after
statehood.”88 He noted that Arizona’s residents, who were largely “old-stock
Americans,” opposed joint admission into the union with New Mexico’s large
Spanish-speaking Catholic population.89 Likewise, Professor John D. Leshy
commented in his study on Arizona’s statehood, that issues on racial equality—or
the prevention of it—dominated the statehood convention.90 The Arizona Territory
had a different Civil War experience than New Mexico. Southerners had briefly
commandeered the Arizona Territory for the Confederacy during the early part of
the Civil War and had a large influence in the state convention, a half-century later.91
In 1861, its provisional pro-confederate governor declared that in addition to
embracing slavery, the territory would exterminate its Apache population.92 This
failed after Confederate president Jefferson Davis refused to consider any
extermination or removal policy.93 During the statehood convention, antimiscegenation articles and the prohibition of mixed-race schools were advanced for
inclusion into the state constitution.94
In 1888, the Arizona Supreme Court upheld an alcohol taxation law that
charged liquor dealers $50 per year but hoteliers and restaurant owners who sold $10
per year of liquor and doctors who prescribed alcohol paid no taxes at all.95 A saloon
and billiard hall owner argued that the territorial legislature had violated the

85. See BERMAN, supra note 28, at 75.
86. JOHN D. LESHY, THE ARIZONA STATE CONSTITUTION 212 (2011).
87. See, e.g., Michael deHaven Newsom, Some Kind of Religious Freedom: National Prohibition
and the Volstead Act’s Exemption for the Religious Use of Wine, 70 BROOKLYN L. REV. 739, 799 (2005).
88. SEAN BEIENBURG, PROHIBITION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND STATES RIGHTS 166 (2019).
89. Id.
90. John D. Leshy, The Making of the Arizona Constitution, 20 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1, 51–52 (2010).
91. RAY C. COLTON, THE CIVIL WAR IN THE WESTERN TERRITORIES: ARIZONA, COLORADO, NEW
MEXICO, AND UTAH 18 (1959).
92. Id. at 122–23.
93. ANDREW E. MAISCH, THE CIVIL WAR IN ARIZONA: THE STORY OF THE CALIFORNIA
VOLUNTEERS, 1861-1865, at 10–12 (2004).
94. Leshy, supra note 90, at 51–52.
95. Territory v. Connell, 16 P. 209, 209 (Ariz. 1888).
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uniformity of taxes rule.96 This rule exists to ensure that the government does not
favor a type of commerce by taxing competing commercial interests out of
existence.97 The Arizona Supreme Court determined that each category of business
constituted a separate class and therefore the uniformity rule had not been violated.
In doing so, Arizona’s justices relied on the Ohio Supreme Court’s 1887 decision,
Marmet v. State.98 However, Marmet arose as a challenge against differing license
rates on horse-drawn wagons, where larger wagons requiring more than a single
horse were charged at a higher rate than single-horse carriages, and dairymen paid a
lower license fee than boiler-haulers.99 Arizona’s justices also relied on a Rhode
Island Supreme Court decision arising from a challenge to differing sewage tax
assessments.100 The city of Providence charged assessments based on the size of
property frontage rather than a property’s use and as a result, the owner of an empty
lot might pay more than the owner of a fully occupied boardinghouse.101 The Rhode
Island Supreme Court recognized the potential unfairness in this scheme but then
determined that the legislature had the authority to enact tax schemes, and the sewage
taxing scheme did not violate the uniformity requirement.102 Given Arizona’s narrow
reading of uniformity in the collection of taxes, at least as it applied to alcohol
establishments, the legislature could, in theory, tax saloons out of existence if it chose
to do so, and at a minimum evidenced that the justices held a dim view of saloons.
In 1895, the Arizona Supreme Court determined that while there existed a
general rule prohibiting jurors in civil and criminal trials to consume alcohol, and
that the consumption of alcohol during the trial would presumptively render a juror
incompetent, the fact that jurors consumed large quantities of wine the evening
before deliberations with the acquiescence of the judge, plaintiff, and defendant,
would not justify overturning a verdict.103 In another decision, titled Cluff v. State,
Arizona’s Supreme Court upheld the evidentiary doctrine of prior bad acts to prove
that a defendant produced or sold alcohol.104 At the time, the prior bad acts doctrine
enabled a prosecutor to use past crimes or instances of immoral conduct to prove that
a witness had the knowledge, or the motive, on how to commit a charged crime. But
the doctrine was frowned upon as a matter of common law, though apparently not in
96. Id.
97. See LaBelle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U.S. 377 (1921); Cummings v. Nat’l Bank, 101
U.S. 153 (1880).
98. Connell, 16 P. at 209–10 (citing Marmet v. State, 12 N.E. 463 (1887)).
99. Marmet, 12 N.E. at 465.
100. Connell, 16 P. at 209. Connell has been cited as late as 1966 to enable differing taxations schemes.
See, e.g., State ex rel. Goddard v. Coerver, 412 P.2d 259 (Ariz. 1966).
101. Cleveland v. Tripp, 13 R.I. 50 (1880).
102. Id. at 61–62. Rhode Island’s justices noted,
We confess that these reasons are not perfectly convincing. But the question is whether,
reinforced as they are by so many precedents, they are not sufficient. The first reason is
the stronger; for, without doubt, the propriety of any given tax and the modes in which
it shall be apportioned and assessed are legislative matters, with which the courts will
not interfere unless the legislature has palpably transgressed some limitation of the
Constitution.
Id. Rhode Island’s Supreme Court further reinforced its acceptance of finding narrow classes under the
uniformity doctrine in Bishop v. Tripp, 15 R.I. 466 (1887).
103. Cooper Queen Mining Co. v. Ariz. Prince Copper Co., 7 P. 718, 719–20 (Ariz. 1895).
104. 142 P. 644 (Ariz. 1914).
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terms of Arizona’s liquor prosecutions.105 In 1913, the justices determined that
drunkenness did not constitute a defense against premeditated murder.106 That year,
they also overturned a robbery conviction where the alleged victim was intoxicated
at the time his money disappeared, and therefore had no memory of the actual
taking.107 Implied in this ruling was the notion that if a victim of a crime was
intoxicated, the victim may have invited the crime to occur, somehow negating the
defendant’s criminality.
The oddest of the territorial supreme court’s decisions originated with a
New York hospital and its orphans who were transported from that city to Arizona.108
The Foundling Hospital of New York City was chartered in New York to care for
abandoned children under the age of two.109 When, in 1904 the hospital received a
request from an Arizona-based Catholic priest requesting that the hospital send
children to the territory so that the local parishioners could adopt them, the hospital
sent forty Caucasian children to the territory.110 It became problematic, apparently,
to members of the local white population on discovery that the adults charged with
adopting the children were neither Caucasian nor of substantial economic means.111
The children were distributed to the adults, until an Anglo citizen allegedly
discovered that the children had been exposed to “beer and whiskey,” as well as
being found in “a filthy condition, covered with vermin, and, with two or three
exceptions, ill and nauseated from the effects of coarse Mexican beans, chili,
watermelons, and other improper food which had been fed them.”112 Several children
were seized by the Anglo population. Although the state’s justices centered their

105. See, e.g., Stokes v. People, 53 N. 164, 175–76 (1973) (the prosecution had cross-examined a
defense witness about prior bad acts merely to impeach the defense witness’ character); see also,
Clevenger v. State, 188 Ind. 592, 125 N.E. 41, 45 (1919).
106. Rodriquez v. Territory, 125 P. 878 (Ariz. 1912). Rodriguez was upset that his wife had informed
him that she intended to dissolve their marriage and in response, he became drunk and shot her. The
justices held that the decedent’s intentions did not constitute a defense and noted, “[b]arbaric practices in
treating the wife as a chattel and brain-storms are not recognized by this court as excuses, under the laws
of Arizona, for committing a crime, nor are they recognized in mitigation of the punishment. Id. at 179–
80.
107. Reynolds v. State, 132 P. 434 (Ariz. 1913).
108. In re New York Foundling Hosp. v. Gatti, 79 P. 231 (Ariz. 1905).
109. See id. at 231. On the creation and purpose of the Foundling Hospital, see LINDA GORDON, THE
GREAT ARIZONA ORPHAN ABDUCTION 1–3 (1999).
110. Gatti, 79 P. at 233. The court noted: “These children were of the Caucasian race, and, as requested
by the said priest, chosen from among those in the institution who were fairest and lightest in complexion.
They were all children of unusual beauty and attractiveness. Their ages were from 18 months to 5 years.”
Id.
111. Id. The court noted:
The evidence establishes, without contradiction, that the persons to whom the children
were given, as assigned, both in Clifton and Morenci, were wholly unfit to be intrusted
with them; that they were, with possibly one or two exceptions, of the lowest class of
half-breed Mexican Indians; that they were impecunious, illiterate, unacquainted with
the English language, vicious, and, in several instances, prostitutes and persons of
notoriously bad character; that their homes were of the crudest sort, being for the most
part built of adobe, with dirt floors and roofs; that many of them had children of their
own, whom they were unable properly to support.
Id.
112. Id. at 234.
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attention on the ethnicity and race of the adoptive parents, they coupled this with the
alleged discovery of alcohol in the homes and determined that neither the adoptive
parents, nor the Foundling Hospital had a lawful claim to the children under the “best
interests of the child” standard, and therefore the children would become a ward of
the territory until such time as other, presumably Anglo, parents could be found.113
II. PRECURSOR TO FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT: THE WEBB-KENYON
ACT AND THE SOUTHWEST
Although a national movement had existed for outlawing liquor since the
beginning of the United States, it was not until 1913 that Congress undertook a
significant step to assist the growing consensus to outlaw the substance. In 1912, an
overwhelming majority of the House of Representatives and Senate voted, in what
became known by its popular title as the “Webb-Kenyon Act,” to prohibit the
interstate shipment of alcohol to states where the possession, sale, manufacture, or
distribution of alcohol was already banned.114 President Taft, who later became
central to the Court upholding the legal enforcement of prohibition as chief justice,
vetoed the act on February 28, 1913, after declaring that it unconstitutionally vested
the states with powers solely placed in Congress to regulate interstate commerce.115
However, Congress overrode Taft’s veto by voting 63-21 in the Senate and 249-97
in the House.116 Of New Mexico’s senators, Thomas Catron (R) voted against
overriding Taft’s veto while Albert Fall (R)—later to be enmeshed in a scandal and
imprisoned for his conduct as President Harding’s Secretary of the Interior—voted
to override the veto.117 Both of Arizona’s senators, Henry Ashurst (D) and Marcus

113. Id. at 237.
114. Pub. L. No. 62-398, 37 Stat. 699 (1913). The Text of the act read:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That the shipment or transportation, in any manner or
by any means whatsoever of any spirituous, vinous, malted, fermented, or other
intoxicating liquor of any kind from one State, Territory, or District of the United States,
or place noncontiguous to, but subject to the jurisdiction thereof, into any other State,
Territory, or District of the United States, or place noncontiguous to, but subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, which said spirituous, vinous, malted, fermented, or other
intoxicating liquor is intended by any person interested therein, to be received,
possessed, sold, or in any manner used, either in the original package, or otherwise, in
violation of any law of such State, Territory, or District of the United States, or place
noncontiguous to, but subject to the jurisdiction thereof, is hereby prohibited.
Id.
115. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FORGOTTEN PRESIDENTS: THEIR UNTOLD
CONSTITUTIONAL LEGACY 180–81 (2013); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW:
THE LAW-MAKERS 33 (1950).
116. On the House vote to override, see To Pass Over President’s Veto, S. 4043 (37 Stat. 699,
3/1/1913), A Bill Divesting Intoxicating Liquors of Their Interstate Character in Certain Cases,
GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/62-3/h254 [https://perma.cc/5L76-L5ZK].
117. On the Senate vote to override, see To Pass Over the Veto of the President, H.R. 17593, A Bill to
Divest Intoxicating Liquors of Their Interstate Commerce Character in Certain Cases, GOVTRACK,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/62-3/s379 [https://perma.cc/V4Z2-KCL2]. Neither Catron nor
Fall appear to be law-abiding men. On Catron, see DAVID CORREIA, PROPERTIES OF VIOLENCE: LAW AND
LAND GRANT STRUGGLE IN NORTHERN NEW MEXICO 47–49 (2013). On Fall and the “Teapot Dome”
scandal, see DAVID STRATTON, TEMPEST OVER TEAPOT DOME: THE STORY OF ALBERT B. FALL 261–301
(1998).
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Smith (D), voted to override the veto.118 In the House, Arizona’s Carl Hayden (D)
voted to override the veto as did New Mexico’s Harvey Butler Ferguson (D).119 In
1917, the Court upheld the act against a claim that Congress exceeded its
constitutional authority in legislating to the states extraordinary control over
interstate commerce.120
After it upheld the Webb-Kenyon Act, the Court continued to back state
prohibition laws. In 1917, in Crane v. Campbell, the Court determined that a state
law prohibiting the possession of alcohol for personal use did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment.121 More importantly, from 1913 onward, a state
government, which prohibited alcohol, could rely on federal law enforcement to
punish persons who transported liquor into their state. For instance, in 1913, Judge
Robert Sharp Bean on the United States District Court for the District of Oregon
conceded that while enforcement of the act would produce confusing results, the
federal courts had a duty to uphold its enforcement.122 And, in 1915, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the grant of an injunction
against a railway company shipping beer from Ohio—a state within the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s jurisdiction—into West Virginia, which fell under the
Fourth Circuit’s jurisdiction.123
a. Arizona, 1914: The Constitutional Prohibition of Alcohol
In 1914, Arizona’s voters amended their state constitution to prohibit the
manufacture, sale, or “any exchange” of intoxicating liquor, wine, and beer.124 Two
years after its passage, the Arizona Supreme Court determined that the amendment
was “absolute and general,” as to preclude a defense of ignorance for violators,
including a defense based on the ignorance of alcohol content in a substance.125
Divided into three sections, the amendment’s first section listed the full range of
prohibited alcohol-related activities. The first section also contained punitive
sanctions for violators including fines and prison sentences ranging from ten days to
two years.126 The second section placed a duty on the legislature to enact laws for
118. To Pass Over the Veto of the President, supra note 117.
119. Ferguson had been voted out of office and replaced by Republican George Curry on March 15,
1913, and therefore Curry did not vote.
120. Clark Distilling Co. v. W. Md. Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 330–32 (1917).
121. 245 U.S. 304 (1917).
122. United States ex rel. F. Zimmerman & Co. v. Oregon-Washington R.R. & Navigation Co., 210
F. 378, 380–81 (D. Or. 1913).
123. West Virginia v. Adams Express Co., 219 F. 794 (4th Cir. 1915).
124. ARIZ. CONST. art. XXIII, § 1 (repealed 1933).
125. Troutner v. State, 154 P. 1048 (1916). The state supreme court cited to Haynes v. State, 105 S.W.
251 (1907), to sustain the denial of ignorance as a defense. In both Troutner and Haynes, the defendants
sold a drink that they claimed they did not know contained an intoxicating alcohol content level. The
Tennessee Supreme Court acknowledged that Haynes owned a grocery store that sold “phosphate and
soda pop,” but he also sold cider and the store was located near a schoolhouse. Id. Ultimately, Tennessee’s
justices determined that the offense was a strict liability offense and therefore “ignorance of the fact or
state of things contemplated by the statute will not excuse violation.” Id. at 252.
126. ARIZ. CONST. art. XXIII, § 1. The amendment was divided into three sections. Section I read:
Ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquor or liquors of whatever kind shall
not be manufactured in or introduced into the state of Arizona under any pretense. Every
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enforcing the amendment.127 This section would become problematic since the
legislature failed to quickly pass implementing law. Finally, the third section
established January 1, 1915, as the effective date for prohibition to take effect.
Following the governor’s signature, the amendment became effective on January 1,
1915.128 The amendment was not the final action of state enforcement laws. In 1919,
Arizona’s legislature enacted a property forfeiture law which permitted the seizure
of vehicles used to transport alcohol.129 Prior to national prohibition taking effect,
the Arizona Supreme Court would go to great lengths to sustain the state amendment.
Arizona’s amendment was quickly challenged by a citizen named Louis
Gherna, who was convicted of violating it, and on appeal he argued that because the
amendment required the legislature to pass further laws to enforce prohibition, it was
not self-executing and therefore no crime listed in the amendment could be
committed.130 In a per curiam decision Arizona’s justices, in Gherna v. State,
conceded, that although it would have been helpful for the legislature to have passed
additional laws specifying enforcement of the amendment, the amendment itself was
enforceable in the state’s criminal trials without any further legislative action.131 The
state’s justices first addressed the second section of the prohibition amendment and,
in utilizing a California Supreme Court decision, In re Bull’s Estate, determined that
the numbering of sections existed for convenience, and not as a means to defeat an
entire amendment.132 The importance to this issue was that if the sections were
numbered in a purposefully inflexible order, the governor would not have
constitutionally been able to sign the amendment until the legislature acted. Bull’s
Estate presents a problematic choice of case law because it did not arise from a
challenge to a state constitutional provision, but rather against a California property
tax law which had omitted a term that resulted in a higher property tax rate on widows
than on a stranger who inherited property, thereby disadvantaging widows.133 The
California Supreme Court, in Bull’s Estate, rectified the legislature’s misstep in

person who sells, exchanges, gives, barters, or disposes of any ardent spirits, ale, beer,
wine, or intoxicating liquor of any kind to any person in the state of Arizona, or who
manufactures, or introduces into, or attempts to introduce into, the state of Arizona any
ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquor of any kind, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be imprisoned for not less than 10 days nor
more than 2 years and fined not less than twenty-five dollars and costs nor more than
three hundred dollars and costs for each offense.
Id.
127. Id. § 2 (“The legislature shall by appropriate legislation provide for the carrying into effect of this
amendment.”).
128. Id. § 3.
129. See, e.g., S. 39, 4th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 1919). This law was never tested but appeared in
Navarro v. State, 256 P. 114 (Ariz. 1927).
130. Gherna v. State, 146 P. 494, 496 (Ariz. 1915). Apparently Gherna was a well-known “bootlegger”
in Douglas County. See Gherna Found in Hospital at Douglas, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Oct. 20, 1915, at 8.
Although not analyzed in this article, Gherna also sought the state supreme court to pass judgment on the
ineffectiveness of the amendment. Gherna, 146 P. at 499–500. Additionally, the justices utilized WebbKenyon to uphold enforcement of the amendment against the argument that the amendment itself was
unconstitutional as it infringed on interstate commerce. Id. at 499.
131. Id. at 498.
132. Id. at 497 (citing to In re Bull’s Estate, 96 P. 366 (1908)).
133. Bull’s Estate, 96 P. at 366.
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printing the code, by assuming legislative intent, and inserted an appropriate term to
enforce equality in the state’s inheritance and property taxes.134
After determining that the amendment’s second section amounted to
surplus language, Arizona’s justices next determined that the amendment was selfexecuting, a task made easier by the use of Bull’s Estate for the obvious reason that
if the amendment’s numbering was a dispositive issue, it would have rendered the
self-execution doctrine into a nullity on state prohibition until the legislature further
acted. In finding the prohibition amendment self-executing, Arizona’s justices turned
to Nowakowski v. State, a 1911 Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals decision.135 In
a reprise of their use of Bull’s Estate, Arizona’s justices relied on a decision not quite
on point to the issue Gherna presented on his appeal. Nowakowski had been
convicted of a 1909 law which made it a felony to sell or give alcohol to a minor or
“a person of unsound mind.”136 Oklahoma’s constitution made it a misdemeanor to
sell, barter, or furnish alcohol to another person, but the penalties under the
amendment were less of a liberty deprivation than those under the prior state law.137
In opposite of Gherna, Nowakowski argued that Oklahoma’s constitutional
amendment was self-executing and therefore triumphed over the felony law as a
matter of preemption.138 In deciding Nowakowski’s appeal, Oklahoma’s justices
determined that self-executing constitutional amendments could be further enhanced
through legislation and that the constitutional provision on prohibition did not restrict
the state legislature’s power to further criminalize alcohol.139 As a result, the Arizona
Supreme Court, in deciding Gherna, used an Oklahoma decision for a purpose
outside of its holding.
The state supreme court issued its decision on October 13, 1915. One day
later, the Arizona Republic, Arizona’s largest circulating newspaper, placed on its
front page a headline which read, “Dry Law Has Sting to It: Supreme Court
Decision,” and its editorial staff claimed that Gherna was “a comprehensive
decision.”140 Perhaps, this reflected a desire to have prohibition remain the law of the
state rather than a compliment to the state’s justices, but at a minimum, the story
placed the state’s citizenry on notice that there was an enforceable statewide
prohibition on alcohol. The importance of Gherna to the state was so great that it ran
prominently alongside major newspaper headlines of the day, including two stories
on the ongoing war in Europe, Pancho Villa’s takeover of Guadalajara, and the arrest

134. Id.
135. Gherna, 146 P. at 498 (citing 116 P. 351, 353 (Okla. Crim. App. 1911)). Unlike Arizona and New
Mexico, Oklahoma’s constitution contained a prohibition amendment from the start. See H. WAYNE
MORGAN & ANNE HODGES MORGAN, OKLAHOMA: A HISTORY 111–112 (1984). Morgan writes that while
Oklahoma was “legally dry,” prohibition was “a failure from the first.” Id.
136. Nowakowski, 116 P. at 351.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 352.
139. Id. at 354.
140. Dry Law Has Sting to It: Supreme Court Decision, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Feb. 14, 1915, at 1.
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in New York City of a suspect involved in the 1910 bombing of the Los Angeles
Times by alleged socialists.141
Following Gherna, the Arizona Supreme Court decided four further
challenges to its constitutional amendment. In Sturgeon v. State, the court determined
that a person who brought a pint of liquor into the state for personal use could not be
convicted under the state constitutional amendment.142 This was because the
amendment never specified that personal consumption had been outlawed, such as
two other state constitutions had done.143 Yet, just as the Supreme Court in Raher
hinted that Congress could prohibit the interstate shipment of alcohol, so, too, did
the state’s justice hint that Arizona’s legislature could ban the personal consumption
of alcohol.144 As of 1916, Arizona’s legislature had not banned the personal
consumption of alcohol and the state’s justices, in Aaron v. State, overturned a
conviction of a defendant who brought whiskey into the state from New Mexico but
was denied the ability by the trial judge to advance personal use as a defense.145
Essentially, the justices determined that if personal use remained permissible, then
the transport of alcohol from another state into Arizona for personal use also could
not run afoul of the amendment.
In Brown v. State, Arizona’s justices determined that the term “beer” was
fully encompassed within the definition of “intoxicating liquor.”146 As a result, when
a brewery attempted to produce a malt-liquor of less than 2 percent alcohol, the
brewery remained in violation of the state’s prohibition amendment.147 The facts
which gave rise to this appeal began in an indictment against a citizen who sold
“Barrette,” a malt beverage professing to have less than 2 percent alcohol content.148
Although it might appear to be self-evident that beer possessed alcohol, the state’s
justices turned to the Nebraska Supreme Court to prove that beer—or Barrette as
used in this case as a subterfuge for beer—was an intoxicating drink.149 In 1918,
141. East Prussian Victory Cause of Rejoicing, Germany Wants Unrestricted Food Shipment,
Guadalajara is Taken by Villa Troops, After Four Years Dynamite Suspect taken in New York, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, Feb. 14, 1915, at 1.
142. 154 P. 1050 (Ariz. 1916).
143. Id. at 1053–54. The court distinguished Arizona’s prohibition amendment from Idaho’s law
where both the possession and consumption of alcohol was illegal. Id. (citing Ex Parte Crane, 151 P. 1006
(Idaho 1915)).
144. Sturgeon, 154 P. at 1055. The state supreme court, in hinting that it was within the power of the
state legislature to prohibit the individual use of alcohol held:
While legislation has been directed to suppress the traffic in liquor, it is apparent that a
sale of liquor is in itself harmless; neither can possession hurt anyone—it is the use of
it that is deleterious to the individual and society, and thus sanctions prohibiting liquor
laws as an exercise of police regulations established by the law-making power for the
prevention of intemperance, pauperism and crime.
Id.
145. 161 P. 881 (Ariz. 1916).
146. 152 P. 578 (Ariz. 1915).
147. Id. at 578–79.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 580 (citing Luther v. State, 120 N.W. 125, 126 (Neb. 1909)). The Nebraska Supreme Court
held, in passing a moral judgment on their state’s law:
Alcoholic beverages are under the ban of the law in some form or other in most civilized
countries. They are known to be the cause of crime, destitution and pauperism. Malt
liquors used as beverages are known to contain that destructive ingredient. It was
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Arizona’s justices upheld a conviction of a druggist who prepared a medicinal
beverage known as Jamaican Ginger, when the beverage contained a high quantity
of alcohol.150 The fact that the amendment contained no exception for medicine was
not considered to render the amendment infirm.151
The brewers and distillers fared poorly. In 1916, the Anti-Saloon League
reported that one brewery remained in Arizona but the state’s distilleries no longer
existed.152 The League referred to Gherna as a “test case,” which proved the viability
of the amendment.153 Ironically, the United States Brewers Association also called
Gherna a “test case,” though it was one that the association had lost.154 In 1918, the
Brewers Association, owing to the large number of German-American brewers and
intense wartime propaganda and anti-German hysteria, suffered a significant loss of
prestige and political power.155 The Anti-Saloon League also juxtaposed the
amendment against the earlier local-option law which it called “a weak law.”156
Finally, the League claimed, in trying to prove the amendment’s success that prior
to 1915, there was one saloon for every 175 residents.157 Of course, after the
amendment, no saloon could legally operate.
b. New Mexico: The Rise and Fall of the Local Option and Questionable
Judicial Ethics
In 1916, the Anti-Saloon League reported that there were two breweries and
three distilleries lawfully operating in New Mexico and that there were 46,571 people
living in the state’s urban areas (Albuquerque, Santa Fe, and Las Cruces), while
280,730 resided in the rural parts of the state.158 The League further opined that “New
Mexico is ripe for state-wide Prohibition.”159 Unlike Arizona, New Mexico did not
vote in favor of state-wide prohibition until after the draft Eighteenth Amendment
was introduced in Congress on August 1, 1917. In 1915 when a test vote on
prohibition was first introduced, it only garnered 25 percent of the vote.160 However,
two years later, over 70 percent of New Mexico’s voters voted in favor of statewide
prohibition.161 There were undoubtedly several reasons for the change. According to
a 1970 study by James A. Burran, the Republican Party dominated the state’s

proved upon the trial of this case that the beverage kept and sold by plaintiff in error
contained it. The liquor sold by him was simply an effort to evade the law.
Id.
150. Cooper v. State, 172 P. 276 (Ariz. 1918).
151. Id.
152. THE ANTI-SALOON YEARBOOK 1917: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FACTS AND FIGURES DEALING
WITH THE LIQUOR TRAFFIC AND TEMPERANCE REFORM 78–79 (Ernest Hurst Charrington, ed., 1917).
153. Id.
154. U.S. BREWERS ASS’N, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-FIFTH ANNUAL CONVENTION
OF THE UNITED STATES BREWERS’ ASSOCIATION 43 (1915).
155. See ANN HAGEDORN, SAVAGE PEACE: HOPE AND FEAR IN AMERICA, 1919, at 53 (2007).
156. THE ANTI-SALOON YEARBOOK 1917, supra note 152, at 79.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 186.
159. Id. at 187.
160. James A. Burran, Prohibition in New Mexico, 1917, 48 N.M. HIST. REV. 133, 146 (1973).
161. Id.
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politics. In this group, the “Old Guard” Republicans in the state were initially aloof
to prohibition, but the progressives in the party favored it and their political influence
grew with the status of their leaders such as former territorial governors Miguel
Otero, Herbert Hagerman and George Curry, and Governor Washington Lindsey.162
Moreover, by 1914, there was a concerted effort to have the Old-Guard join with
progressives in both parties on the issue of prohibition. In January of that year, the
president of the New Mexico Bar Association penned to Senator (and presidential
aspirant) William E. Borah (R-ID), that “a strong effort is being made in this state to
get the progressives and the Republicans together.”163
Burran’s study also noted that Chief Justice Clarence Roberts actively
campaigned for prohibition, though the article did not address the ethical implication
of a state supreme court justice doing so.164 In fact, Roberts sought donations for the
prohibition campaign and enlisted Bronson Cutting, the owner of the Santa Fe New
Mexican, for help.165 Burran also did not include the fact that Richard P. Hobson, a
former Alabama congressman and prohibition leader owned a ranch in New Mexico
and helped fund Anti-Saloon League’s prohibition campaign in the state.166 Although
Hobson is largely forgotten today, he received the Medal of Honor for his heroic
naval service during the Spanish American War and was a national leader for
prohibition.167 Burran did not note that Hobson and Roberts financially assisted R.E.
Farley, the leader of the state chapter of the Anti-Saloon League in financing his
ranch against bankruptcy.168 Their actions could give rise to questions of judicial
ethics and the right to an impartial judge.
Another reason beyond prominent leaders endorsing prohibition, for the
state’s population to vote in favor of a prohibitory amendment may have rested with
the New Mexico Supreme Court’s local option decisions. In 1913, New Mexico’s
legislature enacted two prohibition-type laws based on a “local option” principle.
162. Id. at 136, 139.
163. Letter from M.E. Hickey to William E. Borah (Jan. 17, 1914) (copy on file with author).
164. Burran, supra note 160, at 140.
165. Letter from Francis C. Wilson to Justine Cutting (Oct. 6, 1917) (copy on file with author). This
letter states, in pertinent part:
Judge Roberts of the Supreme Court has charge of the fund being raised by those who
are making the fight for the amendment and he has asked me to ask Bronson if he would
give $500 for the campaign. I think if Bronson were here, he would do so, but I realize
that his not being here makes it impossible to commit him upon the subject. I know that
Bronson has always been very liberal in contributing to such matters, although not
strictly speaking, a prohibitionist himself, and believes in this measure as one which
will benefit the whole state, if it is passed. If you would feel he would do this I would
be glad if you would send the check directly to the Hon. Clarence E. Roberts, Associate
justice of the Supreme Court, Santa Fe, New Mexico. You might write him a nice little
letter, if you feel like it, in Bronson’s behalf.
Id. Interestingly, Cutting’s wife responded with a request that Roberts personally write her a letter to this
effect. Letter from Justine Cutting to Francis C. Wilson (Oct. 11, 1917 (copy on file with author).
166. Letter from R.E. Farley to Richard P. Hobson (June 25, 1918) (copy on file with author); Letter
from Estancia Saving Bank to Hobson, (Dec. 22, 1921) (copy on file with author). Of interest, Hobson
worked with Farley and Governor Lindsey on crafting a law that enabled seizure of law enforcement
officers’ private property if the officer were found to have failed to properly police violations of the liquor
laws. See, e.g., letter from Farley to Hobson (Mar. 10, 1919) (copy on file with author).
167. See OKRENT, supra note 1 at 67–70.
168. Letter from R.E. Farley to Richard P. Hobson (May 22, 1922) (copy on file with author).
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Because the Court had already determined that local-option regarding alcohol did
not violate the United States Constitution, opponents of local option in the state
legislature did not have a considerable rights-based argument to defeat the local
option laws.169 The first local option law enabled the voters of municipalities to vote
in favor of the sale or manufacture of alcohol.170 The second local option law
permitted the voters in counties to similarly vote on preventing the sale or
manufacture of alcohol.171 Both laws required 25 percent of the voters to petition
their respective governments for the law to be considered by the general voting
population.172 Additionally, in 1915, the New Mexico Legislature authorized
municipal governments to not only control licensing of saloons and liquor sales, but
also to prohibit the sale of liquor within city and town limits.173
One of the first challenges to New Mexico’s local option laws was based
on a claim that the state legislature had delegated its law-making authorities to the
general population. An ancient Latin maxim, “delagata potestas non potest
delegari,”—or “no delegated powers can be further delegated”—expressed the rule
that when a duty is placed on an official or a body, the duty cannot be delegated to
others, including the general population.174 In In re Everman, the state supreme court
recognized that early in the nation’s history, other state courts of appeal had ruled
that the Latin doctrine survived and local option laws abrogated the duties placed on
the legislative branch. However, New Mexico’s justices noted that all of the states
except Tennessee had renounced these earlier decisions.175 New Mexico’s justices
also cited to State ex rel. Maggard v. Pond, an 1887 Missouri Supreme Court
decision in which that court distinguished between a legislature passing a law and
then submitting it to the will of the people, from a legislature expressly enabling the
populations of municipalities the authority to vote for prohibition on an individual
basis.176 The later of these did not violate the maxim and it was precisely what New
Mexico’s legislature had done in the local option law of 1913. Unlike the Arizona
Supreme Court in Gherna, New Mexico’s justices in Everman cited to other states’
judicial decisions which appear to have been on-point to the issue raised.

169. Ohio ex rel. Lloyd v. Dollison, 194 U.S. 445, 448–49 (1904). Wayne Wheeler argued on behalf
of Ohio before the Court. Id. at 446.
170. Ex Parte Deats, 1917-NMSC-027, ¶ 1, 22 N.M. 536, 166 P. 913 (citing Chapter 75 of the Session
Laws (sections 2940 to 2948, inclusive, Code of 1915)).
171. Id. (citing Chapter 78 of the Session Laws (sections 2927 to 2939, inclusive, Code of 1915)).
172. See, e.g., In re Everman, 1914-NMSC-016, ¶ 2, 18 N.M. 605, 139 P. 156.
173. Schwartz v. Town of Gallup, 1917-NMSC-021, ¶ 12, 22 N.M. 521, 165 P. 345.
174. See, e.g., Bd. of Liquidation v. City of New Orleans, 32 La. Ann. 915 (La. 1880), in which the
Louisiana Supreme Court determined that the city government as a whole, but not authorized
commissioners, could grant electric tramways the right of way through city streets. Id. at 917. And in
Williams v. Woods, 16 Md. 220 (Md. 1860), the Maryland Court of Appeals held that a broker cannot
delegate his duties to another without the assent of the represented party who employed the broker.
175. 1914-NMSC-016, ¶ 3, 18 N.M. 605, 139 P. 156. In recognizing earlier the earlier cases, New
Mexico’s justices cited to Parker v. Commonwealth, 6 Pa. 507 (Pa. 1847). Parker’s appeal arose from a
violation of a “dry county’s” laws, and he challenged Pennsylvania’s local option laws under the argument
that the state legislature had to decide whether to bar the sale of alcohol though its voting or a general vote
to amend the state constitution. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed with this argument. Id. at 528–
29.
176. State ex rel. Maggard v. Pond, 6 S.W. 469, 474 (Mo. 1887).
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Although the 1913 local option law did give the state’s voters a direct choice
over prohibition at the local government level, the law resulted in a patchwork of
uneven rules across the state. The unincorporated town of Santa Rosa presents an
example of the problems the local option law enabled. On August 10, 1914, its voters
decided against prohibition, but the state attorney general challenged the results
under a claim that the voting had been fraudulently conducted.177 Initially, a district
court granted an injunction against Santa Rosa’s clerk, city council, and sheriff from
issuing liquor licenses, and against a local saloon from selling its intoxicating
beverages, but after taking evidence the trial judge terminated the injunction.178 The
real parties in interest, in the case and on the appeal, however, were Governor
William McDonald (D) a pro-prohibitionist, and two Santa Rosa saloon owners.179
As a result of being mired in motions to strike parties and “bills of exceptions,” the
issue was not resolved until statewide prohibition took effect.
In another case of conflicting rules and actions, on June 10, 1916, the Gallup
board of town trustees—the city’s government—enacted ordinances limiting the
hours a saloon could operate from between 6:00 am and 12:00 am, and increasing an
annual saloon license fee from a $300 to $1,500.180 Gallup’s saloon owners claimed
that the decision to increase the fee had been conducted in private, and that the fee
was an unconstitutional taking by subterfuge.181 Finally, the saloon owners claimed
that a provision in the ordinance favored drug store owners who sold alcohol, and
this provision was contrary to the laws of the state.182 In Schwartz v. Town of Gallup,
a decision authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the court sided with the city
government on all parts of the appeal. Although the justices recognized that the fee
could have the effect of prohibiting alcohol in the city, because the city government
possessed the power to “prohibit altogether the traffic in intoxicating liquors,” the
saloon owners had not truly been injured by the increased fee.183 To make this point
the justices cited to Dennehy v. Chicago, an 1887 Illinois Supreme Court decision,
which upheld Chicago’s authority to prohibit the sale of alcohol.184 In regard to the
ordinance favoring drug store owners over saloons, the justices determined that even
if this section of the ordinance was unlawful, the rest of the ordinance remained
lawful.185 New Mexico’s justices, however, went further than the issue required and
added that the town government would have the authority to pass an ordinance
prohibiting the use of chairs in a saloon.186
After the court issued Schwartz, Gallup’s city government increased
wholesale liquor license fees from $600 to $3,000, and on October 23, 1917, New
Mexico’s justices, in upholding this increase on the same basis as Schwartz tersely
177. State ex rel. Baca v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 1916-NMSC-035, ¶ 1, 21 N.M. 713, 158 P. 642.
178. Id.
179. Id. ¶¶ 1–2, 158 P. at 714.
180. Schwartz v. City of Gallup, 1917-NMSC-021, ¶¶ 1–2, 22 N.M. 521, 165 P. 345.
181. Id. ¶¶ 3–4, 165 P. at 523–524.
182. Id. ¶ 3, 165 P. at 523.
183. Id. ¶ 13, 165 P. at 527.
184. Id. ¶ 15, 165 P. at 527–28 (citing Dennehy v. Chicago, 12 N.E. 227, 235 (Ill. 1887)).
185. Id. ¶ 19, 165 P. at 529. The court noted that the drug-store part of the ordnance had been repealed
by the time of their decision making the matter moot. Id.
186. Id. ¶¶ 20–21, 165 P. at 529–30.
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noted, in Stalick v. Town of Gallup, that while “useful occupations” could only be
taxed or licensed to a degree that enabled a government to regulate the occupation,
“a business which is a constant menace to the public welfare may be licensed and
taxed without any constitutional restraint.”187 The justices added that “the liquor
business is in the latter class.”188 In finding support for their commentary on the
nature of liquor, the justices cited to an 1896 New York Court of Appeals decision
in which that court determined that exorbitant liquor license fees were permissible
to discourage the commercial liquor trade.189
One could conclude that given the New Mexico Supreme Court’s
suggestive comments in Schwartz, the population was on notice that the justices
would fully respect a state constitutional amendment outlawing alcohol for any
purpose. On November 6, 1917, New Mexico’s voters approved of a constitutional
amendment by a margin of over 16,000 voters.190 Prohibition, as captured under
Article XXIII of the New Mexico Constitution prohibited the manufacture, sale, gift,
and trade of alcohol across the state. It did not prohibit the personal use or possession
of alcohol.191 Divided into two sections, the first section enabled the production of
consumable alcohol for “medicinal, mechanical, or scientific purposes only,” and
also contained an exemption for “sacramental wine.”192 The second section set
penalties for violators with fines ranging between $50 and $1,000 and jail sentences
between thirty days and six months.193 Second-time offenders could be fined
between $100 and $1,000 and jailed for up to one year.194 In essence, the amendment
placed alcohol crimes, to include second time offenders, into the misdemeanor,
rather than felony, category.
New Mexico’s justices evidenced a sympathy for business owners affected
by the amendment. For instance, in State ex rel. Martinez v. Holloman, the state
supreme court granted a stay to a saloon owner who had been ordered to dispose of
his liquor stock or transport it out of state.195 In Town of Gallup v. Gallup Cold
Storage Co., an appeal involving a municipal government’s attempts to recover
unpaid liquor license fees, the Court sided with saloon owners in determining that
the fees were not a tax but a payment for the privilege of conducting a business and
since the legislature had never enacted a means to recover unpaid fees, the
municipality was without the means to do so through the state’s debt laws.196 New
Mexico’s justices appear to have harbored a greater sympathy for saloon owners,
brewers, and distillers than their Arizona counterparts.

187. 1917-NMSC-068, ¶ 4, 23 N.M. 405, 168 P. 707.
188. Id.
189. Id. (citing People ex rel. Einsfeld v. Murray, 44 N.E. 146 (NY 1896)). The New Mexico Supreme
Court was not the only state court to cite to Einsfeld. In 1909, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Arie v.
State, 100 P. 23, 25 (Okla. 1909), cited the decision to sustain prohibition.
190. Burran, supra note 160, at 141–42.
191. See, e.g., CHARLES E. SMITH, THE NEW MEXICO STATE CONSTITUTION 207 (2011).
192. N.M CONST. art. XXIII, § 1.
193. N.M CONST. art. XXIII, § 2.
194. Id.
195. 1918-NMSC-138, ¶ 8, 25 N.M. 117, 177 P. 741.
196. 1920-NMSC-052, ¶ 3, 26 N.M. 253, 191 P. 465.
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III. NATIONAL PROHIBITION AND THE OPERATION OF STATE LAW
Once the National Prohibition Act came into force, it supplanted many of
the states’ enforcement mechanisms as the primary means for prosecuting the
manufacture, trade, and transport of intoxicating liquor.197 The federal act, however,
was not the last prohibition measure Congress passed. Concerned with a rise in
medical prescriptions for alcohol, in 1921, Congress passed the Willis-Campbell
Act, prohibiting doctors from prescribing beer to patients as well as liquor which
exceeded a 24 percent alcohol content.198 In 1924, the Court in James Everard’s
Breweries v. Day, upheld the Willis Campbell Act and New Mexico Attorney
General Milton Helmick joined with the United States Solicitor General Beck and
Deputy Attorney General Mabel Willebrant in arguing for the constitutionality of the
act.199 Arizona’s attorney general may have supported the federal government but
neither his nor the governor’s name appeared on Solicitor General Beck’s brief. The
Court upheld Willis-Campbell once more in 1926, though this time neither state
attorney general participated and the American Medical Association protested the
law in an amicus brief.200 Moreover, Justices George Sutherland, James
McReynolds, Pierce Butler, and Harlan Stone dissented on the basis that only the
states could regulate the medical profession, or for that matter, any profession.201
With the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment and the National
Prohibition Act, alcohol prosecutions occurred in the federal courts of both states
and an increase of the Anti-Saloon League’s political power extended into the states,
beyond the state legislatures. Its leader, Wayne Wheeler, influenced President
Harding’s federal judicial nominations as evidenced in the appointment of Fred
Clinton Jacobs to the United States District Court for Arizona. Jacobs was a
prohibitionist and Wheeler supported him in a letter to Attorney General Harry
Daugherty and President Warren G. Harding, even though Jacobs had recently
divorced—divorce, in this era being antithetical to puritan values. 202 Divorce, in this
era was deemed antithetical to puritan values. Jacobs’s appointment can be
juxtaposed against Wheeler’s conduct in regard to a federal judicial vacancy in
Colorado. There, Wheeler convinced Harding and Daugherty to withdraw the
nomination of Walter Dixon. Colorado’s senators, Lawrence Phipps (R) and Samuel
Nicholson (R) had advanced Dixon’s nomination.203 The Anti-Saloon League
claimed Dixon’s appointment would “be a calamity to the cause of prohibition, who

197. See, e.g., People v. Lowell, 230 N.W. 202 (Mich. 1931); Cooley v. State, 110 S.E. 449 (Ga.
1922); State v. Fore, 105 S.E. 334 (N.C. 1922); Lenski V. O’Brien, 232 S.W. 235 (Mo. App. Ct. 1921);
State v. Smith, 199 P. 194 (Ore. 1921).
198. KYVIG, supra note 38, at 31.
199. 265 U.S. 545, 553 (1924).
200. Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581, 599 (1926).
201. Id. at 597 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
202. Letter from Harry Daugherty to Warren G Harding (Feb. 28, 1923) (copy on file with author);
Letter from Fred Clinton Jacobs to Ralph Cameron, United States Senator to Arizona (Feb. 27, 1923)
(copy on file with author).
203. Letter from Lawrence Phipps to Warren G. Harding (Nov. 17, 1921) (copy on file with author);
Letter from Phipps to Harding (Nov. 18, 1921) (copy on file with author).
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would side with those who attack the Eighteenth Amendment.”204 Harding paid heed
to Wheeler and withdrew Dixon from consideration.205 Montana provides another
example of the League’s power. Wheeler opposed the appointment of Fred Gibson
to the U.S. District Court for Montana on the basis that Gibson defended
“bootleggers.”206 Harding withdrew the nomination, but he died before he could
nominate another person.207 In 1923, Harding nominated Orie Leon Phillips to the
United States District Court of New Mexico without opposition from the League.208
Phillips would serve on the district court until 1929 and then ascended to the Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, though he did not rule on any significant liquor
cases.209
In spite of the abundance of federal prosecutions, and as in the case of their
pre-1920 decisions, between 1920 and 1933, the Arizona and New Mexico Supreme
Courts issued over a dozen decisions involving alcohol, though many of these arose
from challenges to the quantum of evidence to prove guilt.210 There were, to be sure,
unusual decisions issued by the supreme courts of both states. In 1922, the New
Mexico Supreme Court determined that a public official who obtained illicit alcohol
but refused to pay the seller was immune from having his wages garnished.211 The
basis for New Mexico’s justices’ refusal to support garnishment was not because of
the illegality of the sale, but rather, that the officer had purchased the alcohol in his
official capacity in 1915 and the law did not authorize wage garnishment of state and
public employee wages.212 In Arizona, the state supreme court determined that a
decedent’s estate could not recover in a wrongful death suit arising from a vehicle
accident when the decedent was a passenger who furnished the negligent driver with
“intoxicating liquor,” thereby violating the state’s prohibition laws.213 Arizona’s

204. Letter from Harry Daugherty to Warren G Harding (Nov. 21, 1921) (copy on file with author);
Letter from Anti-Saloon League to Harry Daugherty (Nov. 13, 1921) (copy on file with author).
205. Letter from Warren G. Harding to Lawrence Phipps (Jan. 14, 1922) (copy on file with author).
206. Letter from Wayne Wheeler to Warren G. Harding (Feb. 20, 1923) (copy on file with author);
Letter from Harding to Thomas J. Walsh (March 3, 1923) (copy on file with author); Letter from Wheeler
to Harding, (May 4, 1923) (copy on file with author).
207. After Harding’s death, President Calvin Coolidge appointed Charles Nelson Pray to the bench.
See CONG. REC. 17,358 (1963).
208. See
Phillips,
Orie
Leon
Biography,
Federal
Judicial
Center,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/phillips-orie-leon [https://perma.cc/8QBW-7JBT].
209. Id.
210. For New Mexico see, e.g., State v. Sutton, 1933-NMSC-016, 37 N.M. 193, 20 P.2d 288
(possession of mash containing alcohol content sufficient to sustain conviction for manufacture of
alcohol); State v. Reese, 1932-NMSC-001, 36 N.M. 28, 7 P.2d 295 (testimony by layperson with some
experience with alcohol permissible to identify alcohol); State v. Asper, 1930-NMSC-098, 35 N.M. 203,
292 P. 225 (While marital coercion might constitute a defense to sale of alcohol to a minor when done in
the presence of husband, the jury verdict will be sustained); State v. Bell, 1930-NMSC-071, 35 N.M. 96,
290 P. 739 (location of still on personal property enough to sustain conviction for manufacture); State v.
Chambers, 1929-NMSC-055, 34 N.M. 208, 279 P. 562 (possession of thirty empty whiskey bottles
sufficient to prove possession); State v. Brigance, 1926-NMSC-032, 31 N.M. 436, 246 P. 897 (the effect
of intoxication on premeditation, and requirement for judicial instruction to jury).
211. Rivera v. Rosenwald, 1922-NMSC-030, 28 N.M. 88, 206 P. 509.
212. Id. ¶ 4, 206 P. at 89–90.
213. Franco v. Vakares, 277 P. 812 (Ariz. 1929).
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justices applied a “joint enterprise” doctrine to bar this type of tort suit rather than
enable a contributory negligence theory to apply.214
Although both states’ populations initially supported prohibition, the midst
of the Great Depression, a national shift to repeal the Eighteenth Amendment took
place.215 The United States had become something other than what prohibition’s
advocates had hoped for. A sizeable part of the population flaunted convention, if
not the law.216 In New Mexico, a prohibition agent’s murder remained unsolved,
though it garnered national attention throughout the second half of 1930.217
Bootlegging and speakeasies were located throughout both states.218
As a test of the national mood, on March 21, 1933 President Franklin
Roosevelt signed the Cullen-Harrison Act into law, thereby enabling the national
sale of beer with less than 3.2 percent alcohol content.219 Perhaps evidencing a
national exhaustion with Prohibition, Congress barely debated this bill before its
passage by the wide margin of 316–97 in the House and by 43–30 in the Senate with
21 not voting.220 New Mexico’s representative, Dennis Chavez (D), voted in favor
of the law while Arizona’s representative Isabella Greenway (D) did not cast a
vote.221 New Mexico’s senator, Sam Bratton (D) voted against the law while Bronson
Cutting (R), did not cast a vote.222 Both of Arizona’s senators, Carl Hayden (D) and
Henry Ashurst (D), voted in favor of the act.223
a. Arizona: Limited Substantive Law after the National Prohibition Act’s
Passage
One of the Arizona Supreme Court’s early decisions arose from a challenge
based on double jeopardy. In 1926, in Henderson v. State, the court was confronted
with an appeal from a state conviction for the possession of intoxicating liquor, but
the defendant had also been convicted in federal court for transporting the same
intoxicating liquor.224 However, this decision arose prior to Palko v. Connecticut, in
which the Court determined that a state criminal trial and a federal criminal trial
represented the independent will of two sovereigns and a defendant could be
214. Id. at 813–14.
215. See, OKRENT, supra note 1, at 329-33.
216. See, e.g., KATHLEEN MORGAN DROWNE, SPIRITS OF DEFIANCE: NATIONAL PROHIBITION AND
JAZZ AGE LITERATURE, 129–64 (2005).
217. See, e.g, CHUCK HORNUNG & B. LEE CHARLTON, TRAIL OF SHADOWS: THE UNSOLVED
MURDERS OF PROHIBITION AGENTS DALE KEARNEY AND RAY SUTTON, 1–12 (2019).
218. ED SIPOS, BREWING ARIZONA: A CENTURY OF BEER IN THE GRAND CANYON STATE, 92–97
(2013).
219. Act of Mar. 22, 1933, ch. 4, 48 Stat. 16 (1933). For the basis of the act, see MARTHA H. SWAIN,
PAT HARRISON: THE NEW DEAL YEARS, 41–42 (1978); and BRUCE KRAIG, THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF FOOD AND DRINK IN AMERICA, VOL I, 144 (2013).
220. To Pass H.R. 33418 (P.L. 3), Providing Revenue by the Taxation of Certain Nonintoxicating
Liquor, and for Other Purposes, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/73-1/h4
[https://perma.cc/WCG8-HX46].
221. Id.
222. To Pass H.R. 3341, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/73-1/s11
[https://perma.cc/HND7-Z2WH].
223. Id.
224. 30 Ariz. 113, 244 P. 1020 (1926).
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prosecuted for the same course of conduct in each.225 Arizona’s justices were able to
rely on United States v. Lanza, a 1922 decision authored by Chief Justice Taft in
which the Court determined that the Eighteenth Amendment’s language encouraged
both federal and state enforcement.226
As in the case of New Mexico, Arizona’s municipalities were vested with a
general authority to enact ordinances and regulations that supplemented the federal
and state laws. However, in regard to liquor traffic enforcement on Arizona’s state
highways, in 1931 the Arizona Supreme Court determined that the state legislature,
whether by intent or mistake, had preempted the authority of municipalities to
enforce local liquor codes.227 Two years earlier, in Hasten v. State, the court
determined that the state law on driving under the influence of alcohol did not mean
that the prosecution had to prove that a motor vehicle operator drove in an unsafe
condition such as speeding, but rather, a prosecutor had only to prove that the driver
was impaired because of the consumption intoxicating liquor.228 This, in effect,
created a strict liability crime based on consumption rather than performance.
Although from a modern vantage point Arizona’s justices provided an obvious
answer, they were confronted by the fact that in 1922 the California Court of Appeals
found that a similarly drafted statute meant that not every driver who was under the
influence of alcohol was guilty of operating a vehicle in violation of state law.229
California was not alone in requiring a prosecutor to prove not only that a motorist
consumed alcohol, but also that the motorist operated a vehicle in an unsafe manner
so as to endanger the public.230 Arizona’s justices instead adopted a New Jersey
Court of Errors and Appeals standard set in State v. Rodgers, a 1917 decision in
which that court determined that even in instances where a motorist appeared to
safely drive a vehicle, as long as there was sufficient evidence to prove the motorist
had consumed a degree of alcohol that could impair his abilities, this was enough of
a quantum of proof to sustain a conviction.231
In spite of the state’s pronounced support for prohibition, the court made it
clear that prosecutorial appeals to emotion or bias were intolerable in Britt v. State
in 1923.232 The decision arose from the prosecution of a barber who allegedly sold
whiskey in addition to cutting hair. The prosecutor’s conduct led to the court
determining that the defendant’s right to a fair trial had been undermined. In response
to a prosecutor’s question as to why the officer arrested the defendant, the officer

225. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
226. 260 U.S. 377, 384–85 (1922).
227. Clayton v. State, 38 Ariz. 466, 297 P. 1037 (1931).
228. Hasten v. State, 35 Ariz. 427, 280 P. 670 (1929).
229. Id. (citing People v. Dingle, 56 Cal. Ct. App. 445 (1922)). In this instance, however, the appellate
court determined that Dingle’s visible condition, which included slurred speech, a staggering walk, and
boisterous language, and the fact that a witness testified he “zig-zagged his vehicle” was sufficient to
sustain a conviction. Id. at 459.
230. See e.g. Owens v. Commonwealth, 147 Va. 624, 136 S.E. 765 (1927).
231. Hasten, 35 Ariz. 427,430 (citing State v. Rodgers, 91 N.J.L. 212 (N.J. Ct App 1917)). It is
noteworthy that in this decision, New Jersey’s justices determined that operating a motor vehicle was
more than a public nuisance and, in interpreting the relevant state statute, it constituted a danger to the
public. Id. at 215.
232. 25 Ariz. 419, 218 P. 981 (1923).
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testified that “he had good cause to believe in the defendant’s guilt.”233 Arizona’s
justices determined that a police officer could not testify as to his belief of a
defendant’s guilt.234 The second issue arose as a result of the prosecutor’s closing
argument in which he claimed to the jury that the defendant and defense counsel
knew of the defendant’s guilt just as the jury would conclude.235 Although the
Supreme Court would not, until 1935, in Berger v. United States, state with clarity
that a prosecutor had a duty to refrain from unfair methods to secure a conviction,
Arizona’s justices had imposed a duty on prosecutors to ensure that no convictions
were obtained “contrary to law.”236
Outside of criminal trials, national prohibition also brought commercial law
challenges to the state supreme court. In Veytia v. Alvarez, the court concluded that
a contract signed in Arizona for the sale of alcohol in Mexico was enforceable in the
Arizona courts.237 Arizona’s justices expressed that although the sale, use, and
possession of intoxicating liquor in the United States was illegal, it was not elsewhere
and added that if the court were to allow the United States citizen to benefit from
non-compliance with a foreign contract, “[it] would be difficult to justify such a
position with other nations. . . . unless we are to consider ourselves the self-appointed
censor of the morals of the world.”238 Two years after deciding Veytia, the state’s
justices reaffirmed, in Cerveceria Cuauhtemoc v. Sonora Bank & Trust Co., that
contracts for alcohol—in this case, beer,—that were signed in Arizona for the
purchase of liquor in Mexico were enforceable in the state’s courts.239 To hold
otherwise, the court concluded, would turn Arizona into “an asylum for dishonest
debtors.”240
At the end of 1921, Thomas Campbell, Arizona’s governor, reported to the
Anti-Saloon League that since the Eighteenth Amendment took effect, “bootlegging
flourished in the State of Arizona to a greater extent than before the enactment of the

233. Id. at 421.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 424. The court noted the prosecutor stated, “I know the defendant is a bootlegger; the
defendant knows he is a bootlegger, and defendant’s counsel knows that I know that the defendant is a
bootlegger.” Id.
236. Id. at 426. The Arizona Supreme Court incorporated the following phrase from the Arkansas
Supreme Court in Holder v. State, 58 Ark. 473 (AR 1894):
The prosecuting attorney is a public officer, ‘acting in a quasi-judicial capacity.’ It is
his duty to use all fair, honorable, reasonable and lawful means to secure the conviction
of the guilty who are or may be indicted in the courts of his judicial circuit. He should
see that they have a fair and impartial trial, and avoid convictions contrary to law.
Nothing should tempt him to appeal to prejudices, to pervert the testimony, or make
statements to the jury which, whether true or not, have not been proved. The desire for
success should never induce him to endeavor to obtain a verdict by arguments based on
anything except the evidence in the case and the conclusions legitimately deducible
from the law applicable to the same. To convict and punish a person through the
influence of prejudice and caprice is as pernicious in its consequences as the escape of
a guilty man. The forms of law should never be prostituted to such a purpose.
Id. at 481.
237. 30 Ariz. 316, 247 P. 117 (1926).
238. Id. at 329–30.
239. 33 Ariz. 220, 263 P. 626 (1928).
240. Id. at 223.
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Volstead Act.”241 Campbell pointed to the ease by which alcohol could be
transported from Mexico, a statement perhaps ironic in light of Vetiya and
Cerveceria Cuauhtemoc. Yet, he did not want to retreat from prohibition and
concluded that it had “improved the condition, both moral and material, of the people
of Arizona.”242 In 1933, Arizonans voted not only to abolish national prohibition, but
also renounced their state prohibition amendment.243
b. New Mexico: A Worrisome Adoption of the National Prohibition Act into
State Law
Although national prohibition came into force on January 16, 1920, and
New Mexico’s legislature had voted in favor of the Eighteenth Amendment in 1919,
it took until 1923 for the state legislature to enact a state law as an analog to the
Volstead Act. Given the state constitution’s prohibition statute, this might not have
been necessary, but the legislature decided to do so. Notably, there are no published
appellate decisions for liquor violations under Article XXIII of the state constitution.
The 1923 state analog to the Volstead Act, titled “Chapter 118,” contained three
substantive sections along with a number of other sections. The first section applied
the penal provisions of the National Prohibition Act to the state law, established the
jurisdiction of state courts over the national act, and charged law enforcement
officers with the duty of enforcing the national act’s mandate.244 The second section
incorporated all “acts or omissions prohibited or declared unlawful” under the
Eighteenth Amendment to be unlawful under state law.245
The third section made state enforcement of the National Prohibition Act
concurrent with federal law such that if Congress repealed the national act or added
new crimes to it, the state law would follow suit without state legislative action.246
This section proved problematic because it enabled state enforcement of future
federal laws without knowing in advance what those laws might be. Two other
sections bear mention. One section permitted the seizure and confiscation of vehicles
taking part in illicit liquor trafficking.247 Another section permitted municipalities to
enact more austere penalties and prohibitions than contained in the federal law.248
Although Chapter 118 appears comprehensive, it was directly copied from the 1921

241. THE ANTI-SALOON YEARBOOK, 1921: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FACTS AND FIGURES DEALING
(Ernest Hurst Charrington, ed., 1921).
242. Id.
243. KYVIG, supra note 38, at 168.
244. N.M. CONST. art. XXIII, § 1 reads:
New Mexico hereby recognizes the requirements of the Eighteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States for its concurrent enforcement by the Congress and
the several states. To that end, the penal provisions of the National Prohibition Act are
hereby adopted as the law of this state; and the courts of this state are hereby vested
with the jurisdiction, and the duty is hereby imposed upon all prosecuting attorneys,
sheriffs, grand juries, magistrates, and peace officers in the state, to enforce the same.
Id.
245. Id. § 2.
246. Id. § 3.
247. Id. § 4.
248. Id. § 6.
WITH THE LIQUOR TRAFFIC AND TEMPERANCE REFORM 139–40
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California Penal Code, and this factor, to New Mexico’s justices, later became an
important aspect of enforcing the law.249
The first Chapter 118 appeal to come before the New Mexico Supreme
Court arose from a challenge to the state’s complete adoption of the National
Prohibition Act into state law. In 1924 in State v. Armstrong, the court determined
that the incorporation of federal law into the state’s criminal code did not violate the
constitutional principle of notice.250 There is an importance to Armstrong beyond its
holding. Although in issuing Armstrong, the New Mexico Supreme Court appeared
to embrace the “reference statute” doctrine to sustain the state’s paramount
prohibition law, there is a note at the bottom of the decision in which two of the three
justices claimed to harbor reservations about the doctrine. Chief Justice Parker and
Justice Clarence Botts commended Justice Tomlinson Fort for authoring the
decision, but then added they “expressed grave doubts as to its correctness.”251
Neither the appellant, Carl Armstrong who had been convicted for operating
an illegal still, nor the state’s justices, cited to United States v. Hudson and Goodwin.
In 1812, the Court in Hudson determined that in order for a federal court to have
jurisdiction over a crime, the crime must be enumerated and a penalty affixed to it.252
Hudson also made it clear that in order for a crime to be enforceable, the general
public must be placed on notice not only of the prohibited conduct, but also of its
penalties.253 While Hudson & Goodwin applied to the federal government, in 1852
the New Mexico Territorial Supreme Court, in Bray v. United States, incorporated it
into the territory’s criminal laws, and in 1913, in Ex parte De vore, the New Mexico
Supreme Court applied it to state law.254 Armstrong could have validly argued that
because the state legislature had failed to proscribe an independent sentence in the
state statute, the statute itself was void.
Armstrong instead claimed that both the Volstead Act and the state law
violated New Mexico’s constitution, specifically because Chapter 118 “embraced
more than one subject.”255 Under the laws of the state, a bill was only permitted to
contain a single subject and the purpose of this rule was to prevent an interested party
from fooling the state legislature into enacting a law with hidden purposes.256 The
justices quickly dispensed with Armstrong’s challenge against the constitutionality
of the state prohibition law and noted that the California Supreme Court had already
upheld a similar law.257 This much was correct. In Ex Parte Burke, California’s
justices, in a very brief opinion, determined that its state legislature possessed the
249. See State v. Armstrong, 1924-NMSC-089, ¶ 3, 31 N.M. 220, 243 P. 334.
250. See generally id., 243 P. at 334-35.
251. Id. ¶ 103, 243 P. at 346; see Roberts, supra note 44, at 41.
252. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
253. See Gary D. Rowe, The Sound of Silence: United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, the Jeffersonian
Ascendancy and the Abolition of Federal Common Law Crimes, 101 YALE L. J. 946–48 (1992).
254. 1913-NMSC-072, ¶ 19, 18 N.M. 246, 136 P. 47.
255. Armstrong, 1924-NMSC-089, ¶ 1, 243 P. at 334.
256. See e.g. State v. Ingalls, 1913-NMSC-068, 18 N.M. 211, 135 P. 1177; Sun Mutual Ins. Co. v.
Mayor of New York, 8 N.Y. 241 (N.Y. 1853). The New Mexico Supreme Court cited to Sun Mutual for
the proposition that the constitutional provision served to safeguard the public’s understanding the law.
Armstrong, 1924-NMSC-089, ¶ 13, 243 P. at 336.
257. Armstrong, 1924-NMSC-089, ¶ 3, 243 P. at 334 (citing to In re Application of Burke, 190 Cal.
326, 212 P. 193 (1923)).
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authority under both the state and federal constitution to adopt a federal law as its
own.258 Yet, California’s justices recognized the difficulty their state’s statute
presented to the public in terms of the potential adoption of future prohibitions
without the state legislature first acting, but then noted that this particular concern
did not specifically apply to Burke’s appeal.259
A full reading of Burke evidences that the California Supreme Court’s
determination was hardly dispositive to the challenge Armstrong raised, namely that
the New Mexico statute violated the state constitution’s prohibition against two
objects contained in a single statute. Indeed, Burke simply upholds the doctrine of
incorporation by reference (or more popularly titles as the “reference statute”
doctrine).260 Perhaps, for this reason, New Mexico’s justices then turned to the laws
of other states, first noting that the Nevada Supreme Court overturned their state
prohibition law which likewise mimicked California’s, in Ex Parte Mantell.261 In that
decision, Nevada’s justices determined that when its state legislature placed the
National Prohibition Act into the state’s law, the legislature had essentially created
a law which served two purposes and this failed to inform Nevada’s citizens precisely
what the state law prohibited as well as who it covered, and therefore violated the
state constitution.262
Although the Nevada Supreme Court had overturned their state’s
prohibition act, New Mexico’s justices focused more on the rationale of preventing
a dual-purpose law rather than on the issue of notice. First, the justices reviewed the
historic basis for singular purpose laws, centering on Savanah v. State, an 1848
Georgia Supreme Court decision arising from a massive land fraud that benefitted a
small number of Anglos at the expense of the state’s Native Americans as well as
poorer white Georgians.263 Prior to that decision, the Georgia legislature had passed
a bill with a title not pertinent to the sale of lands to four companies headed by some
of the state’s prominent politicians, and after this discovery, the state’s constitution
was amended to require honesty in the titling of bills.264 Although integrity in the
titling of statutes is of paramount importance and it was part of the challenge before

258. Burke, 190 Cal., at 327–28.
259. Id. at 328.
260. Id.
261. Armstrong, 1924-NMSC-089, ¶¶ 3–4, 243 P. at 334–35 (citing Ex parte Mantell, 216 P. 509
(Nev. 1923)).
262. Ex parte Mantell, 216 P. at 509, 511. The Nevada Supreme Court held
[i]s there anything in the title in question to enable the people or the legislators to grasp
the purpose and scope of the bill without reference to any other document? We think
not. The so-called title merely declares that it is an act to make the ‘provisions’ of an
act of Congress the law of the State of Nevada.
Id. at 510. Nevada’s justices quipped, “[i]f the ‘National Prohibition Act’ can be a subject of legislation,
why might not our Legislature pass an act entitled ‘An act providing for the enactment into law of House
Bill No. 5000, as passed by the Congress of the United States’?” Id.
263. Armstrong, 1924-NMSC-089, ¶ 12, 243 P. at 335 (citing Savanah v. State, 4 Ga. 26 (1847)). The
Court noted that the reason for the limitation dated to 1789 where the Georgia Supreme Court confronted
a challenge to a bill that purported, by its title, to pay state militia, but in reality, permitted the sale of
territorial lands at discount prices to favored persons. Id. On the land fraud, see Jane Elsmere, The
Notorious Yazoo Land Fraud Case, 51 GA. HIST. Q., 425 (1967).
264. Elsmere, supra note 263, at 425–26.
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the Nevada Supreme Court, it was not a part of Armstrong’s challenge against his
conviction.
Rather, Armstrong argued that in referencing the National Prohibition Act,
New Mexico’s legislature failed to place the public on notice as to the singular aim
of the law. That is, there was an unresolved question as to whether the law simply
recognized the federal act or banned alcohol in New Mexico. The justices turned to
“reference statute” doctrine to answer the issue.265 They reasoned that since the state
legislature had already endorsed prohibition, the referencing of the National
Prohibition Act into Chapter 118 did not create a statute with two objects, but rather,
a statute with a singular aim, the prohibition of intoxicating liquor in the state.266
For the first time in the state’s legal history, the court recognized the
“reference statute” doctrine and in an effort to explain its efficacy, the justices turned
to Phoenix Assurance Co. v. Fire Dep’t of Montgomery, an 1897 Alabama Supreme
Court decision.267 However, that decision arose from an altogether difference type
of reference. In 1870, the Alabama legislature passed a law establishing a fire
department fund for the city of Mobile and placing a fee on fire insurance companies
to help fund the city’s fire department. In 1872, the legislature enacted a similar law
for the city of Montgomery, but instead of clearly and independently listing the fee
in the 1872 law, the law simply referenced the same conditions as the 1870 law.268
In upholding the fee assessments in Montgomery, Alabama’s supreme court
determined that the second law clearly incorporated the first law by its specific
reference to it.269 New Mexico’s justices also pointed to several other state supreme
courts which had likewise relied on the reference doctrine, though in all of these
cases, the doctrine applied to one state law referencing another.270
While New Mexico’s justices realized that there was a difference in
referencing a federal statute into state law, they found it important that the Eighteenth
Amendment stated “[t]he Congress and the several states shall have concurrent
power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” And, because Congress had
clearly defined the punitive terms in the National Prohibition Act, the public was
notified as to a consistent law between the federal and state jurisdictions. As a result,
Armstrong would not have his conviction overturned. Perhaps because of the visible
doubts expressed by the pro-prohibition chief justice and one other justice who
signed onto the majority, it took until 2018 for another court to cite to Armstrong,
and this occurred in the Oklahoma Supreme Court.271

265. Armstrong, 1924-NMSC-089, ¶ 42, 243 P. at 339.
266. See id. ¶¶ 38–39, 243 P. at 338.
267. Id. ¶ 43, 243 P. at 339 (citing Phx. Assurance Co. of London v. Fire Dep’t, 23 So. 843 (Ala.
1898)).
268. Phx. Assurance Co. of London, 23 So. at 844.
269. Id. at 847.
270. Armstrong, 1924-NMSC-089, ¶¶ 46–47, 243 P. at 339 (citing to State ex rel. Linthicum v. Board
of Comm’rs, 94 N.E. 716 (Ind. 1911); Van Pelt v. Hilliard, 78 So. 693, (Fla. 1918); Evans v. Ill. Sur. Co.,
131 N.E. 262 (Ill. 1921); Zeman v. Dolan, 116 N.E. 642 (Ill. 1917); Vallejo & N. R.R. Co. v. Reed Orchard
Co., 147 P. 238 (Cal. 1915); People ex rel. Cant v. Crossley, 103 N.E. 537 (Ill. 1913); Santee Mills v.
Query, 115 S.E. 202 (S.C. 1922); State ex rel. Miller v. Leich, 78 N.E. 189 (Ind. 1906)).
271. CompSource Mut. Ins. Co. v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2018 OK 54, ¶ 21 n. 31, 435 P.3d
90.
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Armstrong, of course, was not the last New Mexico decision to arise from
prohibition. In the 1927 decision State v. Miller, a convicted motorist challenged
New Mexico’s motor vehicle laws as unconstitutional because it criminalized driving
while intoxicated under the state’s general automobile code.272 While the state’s
justices conceded that the offense was listed alongside of rules on lights, brakes, and
turn-signals, legislating a felony under the general statute was constitutionally
permissible.273 Two years later, the court, in upholding the law against a challenge
based on “repeal by implication,” noted that the prosecution needed only to prove
that the defendant operated a vehicle while in an intoxicated condition regardless of
whether the defendant had driven safely.274
As earlier noted, in 1933, Congress passed a national law permitting the
manufacture and sale of 3.2 percent alcohol beer. In 1927, the state legislature
prohibited the sale of beer.275 After the passage of the Cullen-Harrison Act, E.E.
Hamm was indicted for the sale of beer that was lawfully within the federal act, but
not lawful under the 1927 state law.276 In State v. Hamm, the New Mexico Supreme
Court noted that neither the 1927 state law nor New Mexico’s twenty-third
constitutional amendment specified a proscribed level of alcohol for beer.277 Indeed,
as the justices pointed out, it was not until 1929 that the state legislature determined
that beer with an alcohol content of more than 1 percent was an intoxicating
beverage.278 In upholding New Mexico’s law, the court recognized that while it was
true that Congress and Roosevelt had determined that 3.2 percent beer could not be
considered intoxicating, this recognition did not triumph over the state legislature’s
determination in opposite.279 As a result, for the sale of beer to begin in New Mexico,
the state legislature and governor would have to affirmatively act.
In contrast to Governor Campbell’s assessment of crime in Arizona, in
1921, New Mexico’s governor, Merritt C. Mechem informed the Anti-Saloon
League that the state police assiduously enforced prohibition and that it benefitted
the poorer citizens in the state.280 Mechem, like Campbell, recognized that alcohol
smuggling occurred between Mexico and New Mexico, but noted that he was hopeful
this would cease once the Harding administration reestablished diplomatic relations
with Mexico.281 And, finally, Mechem claimed that prohibition had grown in
popularity.282 Mechem’s comment on the trans-border liquor trade underscored the
amount and means of alcohol being brought into New Mexico. In 1927, prohibition

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

1927-NMSC-045, 33 N.M. 200; 263 P. 510.
Id. ¶¶ 15, 21, 263 P. at 513–14 .
See State v. Tinsley, 1929-NMSC-085, ¶¶ 8–9, 34 N.M. 458, 283 P. 907.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-101 (repealed 1939).
State v. Hamm, 1933-NMSC-067, ¶ 1, 37 N.M. 437, 24 P.2d 282.
Id. ¶¶ 9–10, 24 P.2d at 283.
Id. ¶ 10, 24 P.2d at 283.
Id. ¶ 13, 24 P. at 284.
THE ANTI-SALOON YEARBOOK, supra note 152, at 244.
See id.
Id.
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agents and sheriffs shot down an airplane carrying illicit tequila into the state and
thousands of gallons of liquor were brought across each year.283
Mechem’s observation on prohibition’s popularity proved to be a false
prediction. By 1932, the Anti-Saloon League in New Mexico was out of money and
there was a paucity of donors. Its director, George Hammond corresponded with the
League’s Ohio-based headquarters that there were few viable candidates who “had
sympathy with our cause.”284 After the national election, the state chapter was
bankrupt.285 On September 22, 1933, Hammond reported “the election is over and as
you know, it went overwhelmingly wet,” adding “the churches and the people of the
state have almost absolutely quit supporting the cause.”286 Within two months, New
Mexico’s voters decided to abolish national prohibition.287
IV. CONCLUSION
Just as Prohibition left an indelible mark on American society, from
reducing the annual consumption of alcohol, to increasing communities suffering
from political corruption and a rise in crime, the supreme courts of Arizona and New
Mexico also left a permanent mark on the law of the two states. One of the clearest
examples of the permanency of the change is in the states’ driving laws. In 1967, the
Arizona Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that in a driving under the influence
prosecution, the prosecutor only had to prove that the driver’s control of the vehicle
was “to the slightest degree affected by his consumption of the intoxicant.”288
Following their cite to Hasten, Arizona’s justices noted “we take judicial notice of
the terrible toll taken, both in personal injuries and property damage, by drivers who
mix alcohol and gasoline, and we conclude that the test is as sound today as it was
thirty-eight years ago when it was first enunciated.”289 The New Mexico Supreme
Court has likewise held that the prosecution does not have to prove harm or erratic
driving, but rather, that the defendant was merely intoxicated.290
In 1953, in Hudson v Kelly, the Arizona Supreme Court referenced Gherna,
making a general holding of that decision valid.291 The decision arose from the state
purchasing tires and then refusing to pay the commercial seller because the purchase
occurred contrary to a new law.292 The seller claimed the new law was
unconstitutional as it embraced more than one subject and that, at best, the new law

283. ELVIS E. FLEMING, TREASURES OF HISTORY IV: HISTORICAL EVENTS OF CHAVES COUNTY, NEW
MEXICO 141–44 (2003).
284. Letter from George M. Hammond to H.B. Sowers, (Feb. 26, 1932) (copy on file with author). On
October 15, 1932, Hammond wrote to Sowers, “I do not want you to think for one moment that we are
thinking of quitting or that our labors are in vain. The work had been so neglected that we had to start
over again and build the Anti-Saloon League back into the confidence of the people. Letter from
Hammond to Sowers (Oct. 15, 1932) (copy on file with author).
285. Letter from Hammond to Sowers (Aug. 2, 1933) (copy on file with author).
286. Letter from Hammond to Sowers (Sep. 22, 1933) (copy on file with author).
287. See KYVIG, supra note 38, at 179.
288. Noland v. Wootan, 427 P.2d 143, 144 (Ariz. 1967).
289. Id.
290. See State v. Johnson, 2001-NMSC-001, ¶ 14, 130 N.M. 6, 15 P.3d 1233.
291. 263 P.2d 362, 364–65 (Ariz. 1953) (citing Gherna v. State, 146 P. 494 (Ariz. 1915)).
292. Id. at 363.
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repealed the prior state purchasing laws only by the scantest implication.293 In siding
the seller, Arizona’s justices cited to Gherna for the proposition that a court declaring
a law null had to be rare and conducted with “delicacy.”294 But in this instance, the
tire seller surpassed the Gherna threshold where a generation earlier hundreds of the
state’s consumers of “intoxicating liquor” had failed. In 1982, the Arizona Supreme
Court upheld the doctrine of parallel prosecutions between the state and federal
government and cited to Henderson for the proposition that it had been permissible
to do so.295 In 1967, in State v. Enriquez, Arizona’s justices cited to Britt, to reaffirm
the ethics canon that a prosecutor may only secure a conviction by lawful means and
without asking the jury to conjecture about the evidence that had not been
presented.296
Of the New Mexico Supreme Court decisions that have survived to the
present, In re Everman appears to have had a lasting effect on the law though it has
been modified. A liquor license remains a privilege rather than a right, as the justices
articulated in Everman. However, in 1983 the court determined that the denial of a
license could only become permanent after an applicant was afforded administrative
due process to contest the denial or revocation.297 So too does the influence of
Schwartz v. Gallup survive, at least for the proposition that if a part of an ordinance
is invalid under the law, the remainder of the ordinance is presumed valid.298 In a
broad sense, the effect of prohibition on New Mexico’s motor vehicle laws led to the
legislature and state law enforcement pursuing a vigorous program to prevent
intoxicated persons from driving under the influence through deterrent and punitive
measures.299 The New Mexico Supreme Court, in State v. Bullcoming, determined
that blood alcohol results generated by a machine were business records, but the
Supreme Court overturned the decision based on a violation of the Confrontation
Clause.300
These are a few of the aspects, developed during prohibition, which have
become embedded in the current laws of the nation’s two newest contiguous states.
Of course, laws respecting the public’s safety and morals have developed in other
areas. But prohibition was unique in the sense that it made illegal an activity popular
amongst the nation’s residents, only to be renounced within two decades of its
imposition. Prohibition also served as a legal means to both de-stratify society of
ethnicity and religion, while imposing the morals of a nationally majoritarian faith
and world view on the diverse populace of both states. But prohibition’s supporters
ultimately failed to convince religious and ethnic minorities, as well as significant

293. Id.
294. Id. at 364–65 (quoting Gherna v. State, 146 P. 494, 501 (Ariz. 1915))
295. State v. Poland, 645 P.2d 784, 791 (Ariz. 1982) (citing Henderson v. State, 244 P. 1020 (Ariz.
1926)).
296. 430 P.2d 422, 425 (Ariz. 1967) (citing Britt v. State, 218 P. 981 (Ariz. 1923).
297. Chronis v. State, 1983-NMSC-081, ¶¶ 17–19, 100 N.M. 342, 670 P.2d 953.
298. See Bradbury & Stamm Constr. Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 1962-NMSC-078, ¶ 7, 70 N.M. 226,
372 P.2d 808.
299. See, e.g., State v. Gurule, 2011-NMCA-042, 149 N.M. 599, 252 P.3d 823; State v. Harrison,
1992-NMCA-139, 115 N.M. 73, 846 P.2d 1082.
300. 2010-NMSC-007, 147 N.M. 487, 226 P.3d 1, rev’d sub nom. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564
U.S. 647 (2011).
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numbers of majorities, to become puritan in their lives and abandon their own
identities.

